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1. Introduction 
In 2013 there were three major humanitarian crises, each appointed as the highest level of 
emergency by UN, and the crisis following the devastating typhoon Haiyan in the 
Philippines was one of them (GHA 2014). A tropical cyclone hit the central Philippines on 
November 2013 causing a lot of damage in human, social and economic sectors. 14.1 
million people were affected and more than 6000 people died. The damage was wide in 
private sector and the loss of livelihoods was remarkable. The devastation was wide 
especially on the coastal areas, and more than million houses were damaged (UN OCHA 
2013). 
Natural hazards become disasters when they meet society. The factors that contribute to the 
increase of natural disasters are partly the rise in people’s vulnerability, and partly other 
factors, such as climate change (Venton et al. 2012; Yodmani 2001). Not enough attention 
has been paid on the social processes that have a large role in the ways in which 
catastrophes impact societies (Zakour & Gillespie 2013). Blaikie et al. (1994) were the first 
researchers to present a model that highlights the role of social factors in disasters. In that 
model disaster is not just a consequence of a natural hazard, but a more complicated event 
that arises from vulnerability.  
International disaster aid is vital both in the emergency relief and recovery processes. 
Despite the fact that saving lives in emergencies is extremely important, the post-disaster 
aid has failed to decrease the risks of developing countries from the continual exposure to 
natural disasters (Linnerooth-Bayer 2005). Therefore it is important to focus on making 
humanitarian response more sustainable by linking short term emergency help to longer 
term developmental goals. The ways in which that can be done are for instance focusing on 
livelihood and income restoration, providing adequate housing and improving disaster 
preparedness. Taking advantage of the local capacity and participating local people in order 
to gain sustainability are important parts of humanitarian response. Reducing 
vulnerabilities and building capacity of the local communities also reduce the dependency 
of aid (Venton et al. 2012).  
It has been agreed that a greater emphasis should be directed towards disaster preparedness 
in order to reduce the impacts of the disasters. Even more importantly, disaster resilience 
should be implemented in the humanitarian aid in order to improve the coping mechanisms 
of the at-risk communities (Venton et al. 2012). In the best possible case humanitarian aid 
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makes people less vulnerable for future disasters by increasing their capacities to cope with 
the disasters. The importance of disaster risk reduction has been agreed in Hyogo 
Framework for Action and disaster resilience will most probably be underlined in the post-
2015 development agenda (Turnbull et al. 2013). 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the post-disaster recovery to typhoon Haiyan in the 
Philippines from a social perspective. The focus is on early recovery and the crucial step 
from emergency help to longer term aid. Besides the first goal it is beneficial to investigate 
the ways in which local community disaster resilience is being built. Additionally I will 
pay attention to the resilience systems of the local people of their own. 
I have conducted this thesis as a qualitative case study. The topic is approached from the 
experiences and perceptions of the local crisis-affected people. Disaster response and 
people’s resilience is examined trough a case study from Samar, Philippines which 
comprised a period of field work in three study areas. The key method for data collection is 
individual semi-structured interview. 
1.1. Research questions and the aims of the study 
This research aims to elaborate the disaster impacts and post-disaster recovery from a 
social perspective after typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines that hit the country on 8 
November 2013. My approach to this topic is human geography and particularly 
development geography. Natural disasters are not only a field of study for physical 
geographers, but additionally it is important to consider the social impacts of natural 
disasters. Therefore geographers are ideal for researching them. The first objective of this 
study is to examine the disaster’s impact on people. The second objective considers the 
disaster response of humanitarian actors particularly in early recovery. Lastly, third 
research question elaborates the resilience of the communities and the role of humanitarian 
organizations in increasing the resilience and building the capacity of local people.   
Impacts of disasters, especially on vulnerable people, and the social processes intensifying 
the impacts need more studying. Poor countries as a whole are more vulnerable to hazards 
than wealthy countries, but there are groups of more vulnerable people inside the countries 
and societies as well (Blaikie et al. 1994). Natural disasters may financially cause more 
damage in the Western world but in a poor country the vulnerability of people makes the 
damage larger in humanitarian scale. In addition, mortality rates after a disaster are higher 
in developing countries than developed countries. Poor people are often forced to live in 
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hazard prone areas that make the consequences more serious. The reasons for higher 
mortality rates in developing countries are usually weaker warning systems, the weaker 
supply of aid in post-disaster situations and weaker mass evacuation (Strömberg 2007). 
Next I will present the research questions of this study. The first research question is: 
1. How the disaster affected the daily lives of people? 
I will respond to the first question on the basis of secondary and primary data. The primary 
data will answer the question from the approach of the crisis-affected people whereas the 
secondary data will discuss the issue on a more general level. The reason to have this 
question first is that in order to analyse the disaster response I need to establish an 
understanding of the impacts of the disaster to the daily lives of the people. I will focus 
mainly on basic needs which are defined as follows: “vitally linked to food, but also 
include shelter, clothing, cultural values and social relationships” (Gaillard & Cadag 
2009:200).  
The second research question is: 
2. How well early recovery is implemented in the disaster response from the 
perspective of crisis-affected people? 
o The focus is on 1) livelihoods restoration, 2) housing and 3) disaster 
preparedness and disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
The second research question addresses the disaster response of humanitarian actors. The 
post-disaster early recovery is evaluated from a social perspective. I have chosen to focus 
on livelihoods and income recovery, housing, and disaster preparedness in the 
communities. I chose these three sectors because they are thematically more central in 
geographical research and obviously it is not possible to focus on all the numerous sectors. 
In order to respond to this research question I will use a specific guideline for early 
recovery as well as the early recovery plan for post-Haiyan recovery. Examining how the 
policies are obeyed at the grass-roots level from the perspective of the crisis-affected 
people will motivate this study. The third sector, disaster preparedness leads the discussion 
to the last research question. 
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The third research question is divided in two parts: 
3. a) What is the role of communities’s own resilience systems in disaster recovery?  
o e.g. social capital, community assets   
b) What are the ways in which humanitarian aid has been able to support affected 
communities to create an enabling environment for building disaster resilience? 
o focus on capacity building, participation, social capital 
The research aims to be a case study. It will not try to offer facts or laws but theoretical 
statements of the issue under research. As a semi-ethnographic research it does not try to 
simplify the existing situation, but to explain and understand changing and layered 
situations (Blommaert & Jie 2010). Gerring (2004) describes a case study as “…an 
intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) 
units”. Also Blommaert & Jie (2010) claim that generalization based on a single case is 
possible when one case is situated to a larger category of cases and theoretical models will 
be applied to it. That is how even a single case can reveal much larger things from the 
issues in society. 
This study only deals with a limited group of the overall people affected by the crisis. One 
challenge for this study is the process of recovery that is still on-going. Therefore the 
results of this research will only indicate the situation when the field work was conducted 
which was exactly one year after the typhoon hit the area. I will approach all research 
objectives from the perspective of the crisis-affected people. Both secondary and primary 
sources are used as data in this study, but the focus is on the data collected on the field.  I 
collected the primary data in Samar, Philippines, using semi-structured interview with 
crisis-affected people as the key method. The secondary sources include different policy 
papers such as directives, recovery plans and standards for humanitarian aid as well as 
literature review.  
I have chosen the case of Haiyan because Philippines is one of the hotspot countries in the 
world when it comes to natural disasters and it experiences around twenty typhoons and 
storms every year (World Bank 2009). Additionally, typhoon Haiyan received a lot of 
attention in international media which also aroused my interest. Humanitarian agencies as 
well as the government of the Philippines received a great deal of donations. At the time of 
the field work there were still a lot of humanitarian agencies, both from abroad as well as 
locals working in the typhoon hit areas.  
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This study aims at giving voice for the crisis-affected people whose conditions the 
humanitarian response strives to improve. I will try to ensure that the opinions of the local 
people are in the center of this study, together with scientific information. Another motive 
for this study is to collect information that is more objective compared to the reports made 
by humanitarian agencies and governments. The wider aim for this study is to work as 
scientific information for the various actors in the humanitarian as well as developmental 
field in order to improve the disaster preparedness.  
2. Theoretical framework 
In this chapter I will present the theoretical framework and key concepts of this study. I 
will begin by discussing humanitarian aid in post-disaster context and then connect it to a 
broader discussion about the differences between humanitarian and development aid. I will 
focus on the crucial part of humanitarian aid, early recovery, in which humanitarian aid is 
linked into long-term development programs. In order to have a deeper understanding of 
the impacts of disasters for society I will introduce the concept of vulnerability. 
2.1. Definitions of the key terms 
 
Humanitarian crisis-affected people are often described as victims. However, one has to 
keep in mind that victim is not a neutral word but it arouses negative associations. 
Especially humanitarian organizations should not perceive the members of affected 
communities as victims but they should more likely see the potential and personalities of 
the crisis-affected people. The primary meaning of 'victim' is that a person is a victim in 
consequence of a harmful issue but 'victim' can also refer to the status or identity. Often the 
categorization rules out the other identities of that person and only vulnerability, passivity, 
helplessness and other weak and passive aspects remain. The other identities that a person 
might have, such as a parent or a teacher will then be ignored (Meredith 2009). Also the 
Code of Conduct reminds that the disaster victims should not be seen only as victims but 
rather as dignified human beings (IFRC 2014). For humanitarian agencies and donors 
‘victims’ are always seen as beneficiaries (of the assistance) which does not serve the 
purpose of this study as a scientific research either. Because of the subjective character of 
the word ‘victim’ I will use the word crisis-affected people in this research which is the 
most neutral. That definition includes all the members of the communities that were 
affected by the typhoon Haiyan in any way. 
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Livelihood is one of the key concepts in this study and therefore needs a definition. 
According to the British Development Agency (DFID 2005) “a livelihood comprises the 
capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for 
a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from 
stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the 
future, while not undermining the natural base.“ The definition by DFID is appropriate for 
this study since it takes to account the aspect of sustainability too.  
Turnbull et al. (2013) describe disasters in humanitarian and development sectors as 
“situations that involve a major and widespread disruption to life in a community or 
society, from which most people are not able to recover without assistance from others, 
often from outside that community or society. “ The disasters often involve losses of life, 
buildings and other assets but they also impact on people’s security, health and livelihoods 
(Turnbull 2013 et al.).  
Another key concept for this study is humanitarian aid which is further divided into two 
phases: relief and recovery. These terms as well as the difference between humanitarian aid 
and development aid will be explained in more detail in chapter 2.2 and 2.4 but I will 
shortly define humanitarian aid in this chapter. Vulnerability, as one of the key concepts, 
will be explained in chapter 2.8. 
Humanitarian aid divides roughly into two phases. The first phase is emergency relief and 
the second is recovery and reconstruction. Emergency relief is short-term aid and the 
immediate help that plays a crucial role in the first weeks and months after the disaster. It 
aims at ensuring the basic needs, such as water supply, food, medical care and shelter. The 
relief phase also includes search for people and technical aid depending on the character of 
the disaster (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs 2009:8; Régnier et al 
2008).  The length of the relief phase depends on the geographic location, the magnitude of 
the disaster, and the sector of relief aid (Cosgrave & Tellford 2006:30).  
Recovery and reconstruction comprise the second phase of humanitarian aid. 
Rehabilitation is an additional term used for this phase. Recovery is longer term help that 
aims to restore the livelihoods sustainably being the most significant part of the 
humanitarian response. Recovery process includes the actions taken by national and 
international actors to improve or restore the living conditions from the situation before the 
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disaster. The actions involve permanent housing, schooling and establishing new ways of 
livelihoods or re-establishing the pre-disaster livelihoods (Cosgrave & Tellford 2006:30). 
2.2. Humanitarian aid and financing – overview 
 
Humanitarian aid is officially separated from development aid. In a Statistical Directive by 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD humanitarian assistance is called 
“emergency and distress relief aid”. An emergency is described as “an urgent situation 
created by an abnormal event which a government cannot meet out of its own resources 
and which results in human suffering and/or loss of crops or livestock. Such an emergency 
can result from i) sudden natural or man-made disasters, including wars or severe civil 
unrest; or ii) food scarcity conditions arising from crop failure owing to drought, pests and 
diseases.” (Fearon 2008:51). There are four types of bodies that provide humanitarian aid. 
The ones that provide aid directly are called humanitarian agencies, such as Red Cross. 
Other three groups are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government donors and 
multilateral agencies, particularly United Nations agencies (Riddell 2008).  
The core principles for humanitarian aid are the followings: 1) impartiality, which states 
that aid should only be based on needs 2) neutrality, in a way that it is not favouring any 
side (e.g. in a conflict) 3) independently provided and 4) unconditional, so that there are no 
expectations to receive anything back (Riddell 2008:312). Humanitarian action is a 
response to the suffering of strangers. Many humanitarian actors or organizations say that 
they help because of the “ethical urgency of suffering” or solidarity (Calhoun 2008; 
Harmer & Cotterrell 2005). According to Calhoun (2008) humanitarian action has three 
objectives: to relieve suffering, to improve the condition of humanity and to respond to 
unexpected and compelling crisis.  
There has been an increase in humanitarian aid in scale and significance during the last 20 
years and the number of humanitarian organizations has risen tremendously after Cold 
War. The percentage of humanitarian aid in official development assistance (ODA) has 
also grown over the years, and it almost doubled between the early 1990s and 2000 
(Barnett & Weiss 2008; Harmer & Cotterrell 2005, Riddell 2008).  
In the 1990s the humanitarian assistance through UN agencies declined notably and there 
was a transition towards bilateral aid. Bilateral aid technically means that the money is 
directed from one single state to another. In 2000 38 % of humanitarian assistance was 
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spent bilaterally. The share of aid channeled through multilateral organizations, such as 
UN, dropped partly because the urge of the affected community is not always the only 
reason for humanitarian contributions. The donors want visibility of their contributions and 
their own interests may be more important than the needs of the state in crisis. Especially 
among the non-DAC states most of the humanitarian aid is related to the security issues 
and foreign policy, and there is a strong preference for giving to neighbouring countries 
over countries in other regions. Donor countries prefer bilateral aid also because it is 
supposed to save time when aid is channeled straight from government to government 
(Barnett & Weiss 2008; Harmer & Cotterrell 2005). Gross Stein (2008:127) argues that 
states are now the principle donors, and humanitarian organizations are the ones delivering 
aid. There has also been rise in the number of NGOs implementing humanitarian aid 
programmes. Donor governments are channeling large shares of their humanitarian aid 
through NGOs (Riddel 2007). However the role of The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) is still significant: funding to ICRC emergency appeals was US$1,192 
million in 2014 (GHA 2014).  
Financially the biggest contributors of humanitarian aid are the OECD DAC donors which 
are the 29 members of OECD DAC including EU institutions. The biggest single 
contributors of international humanitarian assistance in 2013 were United States, European 
institutions, United Kingdom, Turkey and Japan, but the humanitarian assistance from non-
DAC is increasing as well. Non-DAC countries, including countries in Asia and Latin 
America, States in the Gulf and South Africa for instance have been participating in 
providing humanitarian assistance for many years (Harmer & Cotterrell 2005; GHA 2014). 
During the last five years the proportion of private donations (individuals, foundations, 
corporations etc.) has increased and the private funding has accounted up to 26 % of the 
total international humanitarian response (GHA 2014).  
At the World Summit 2005 ‘responsibility to protect’ was more largely accepted by the 
world leaders as part of the humanitarian action. That means a growing attention to be paid 
on human rights. The acceptance for the view that politics matter in humanitarian aid and 
that it is necessary to make a political assessment (even if the disaster is caused by nature) 
has been growing. However, agencies have different opinions of what that means for them 
(Riddell 2008: 330).  
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2.3. International standards for humanitarian aid  
 
The number of crises has increased during the last decades which has added the need to re-
asses the quality of humanitarian aid.  Several standards have been created in order to 
increase the effectiveness and quality of humanitarian aid for all the workers in 
humanitarian situations. Six of them will be introduced below: Code of Conduct, The 
Sphere Project, HAP, People In Aid, ALNAP and IATI.  Following of the standards is 
voluntary, but it will ensure better quality of humanitarian work. 
2.3.1. Code of Conduct 
Code of Conduct was created in 1994 by Red Cross, Red Crescent Movement and other 
significant NGOs in the field to set universal standards for humanitarian aid. Code of 
Conduct is based on ten principles from which the first four highlight the impartiality, 
neutrality and independence of humanitarian aid including the fact that it’s neither a tool of 
foreign policy nor a tool to further political or religious standpoints. The fifth principle 
handles the respect for culture whereas the sixth and seventh principles focus on the role of 
local capacities and the involvement of beneficiaries in the management of humanitarian 
response. Principle eight urges to reduce future vulnerabilities and principle nine to be 
accountable for both the affected people and the people from whom we receive resources. 
The last principle reminds us to see the disaster victims not only as victims but rather as 
dignified human beings (IFRC 2014).   
2.3.2. The Sphere Project 
The Sphere Project was established in 1997 also by Red Cross, Red Crescent Movement 
and a group of humanitarian NGOs. It aims at improving the quality of humanitarian aid 
and increasing the accountability of aid. The main offering of Sphere Project is the Sphere 
Handbook on Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian response. 
That handbook is made for planning, implementation and monitoring humanitarian 
response and it is accepted as a set of standards on a wide scale in humanitarian field. The 
Sphere Project philosophy is based on two core principles, from which the first one 
highlights the right of the affected people to live with dignity and the second one the right 
of the affected people to get assistance, in a way that everything possible is done to reduce 
human suffering. The Sphere Handbook named four minimum standards for the key 
sectors in humanitarian aid which are WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene), shelter, 
settlement and NFI, nutrition and food aid, and health services. These minimum standards 
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are to be met in any humanitarian response. The participation of the affected people is also 
in the core of Sphere Project philosophy (The Sphere Project 2014).  
There are six core standards that are essential to achieve the Sphere minimum standards 
and which need to be met in all sectors. The first (1) standard highlights people-centered 
humanitarian response which means participation of affected people and supporting local 
capacity in the humanitarian response. The second (2) core standard is coordination and 
collaboration which indicates to coordination with all the relevant stakeholders, such as 
authorities, humanitarian agencies and civil society organizations. The standard three (3) is 
assessment which means identifying the needs of affected people systematically 
immediately after the disaster. Next core standard is design and response (4) which is a 
continuation of the previous standard meaning designing the humanitarian response from 
the basis of the needs assessment collected before. The fifth (5) core standard is 
performance, transparency and learning which refers to the transparency of humanitarian 
agencies’ activities towards stakeholders. The performance of humanitarian agencies 
should be examined all the time and communication with the stakeholders should be 
continual. The final core standard (6) is aid worker performance. That refers to the 
enabling of the aid workers to have the needed skills and knowledge to implement 
effective humanitarian response. It also indicates the respectful attitudes of the aid workers 
towards the affected community and other stakeholders. In order to let the aid workers to 
do their work in the best possible way they should be provided with management, 
supervisory and also psychosocial support (The Sphere Project 2014).  
The Handbook emphasizes particular focus on specific vulnerabilities and capacities. As 
individuals have different levels of access to resources and power, people are impacted on 
a different level from disasters. Women, children, older people, persons with disabilities or 
people with HIV are mentioned as groups that need to be particularly addressed in relief 
and recovery efforts (The Sphere Project 2014). 
2.3.3. Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership was formed in 2003. It highlights the 
accountability of humanitarian aid to its beneficiaries and different stakeholders. It 
considers the needs, concerns and capacities of the beneficiaries important and aims at 
reducing the possibility of mistakes and corruption by accountability of organizations. In 
HAP accountability is understood as “the means through which power is used 
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responsibly”. HAP is based on ten principles from which the first four, humanity, 
impartiality, neutrality and independence come from the fundamental principles of the Red 
Cross which are mentioned in the earlier chapter of Code of Conduct. The last six 
principles are more related to accountability, such as transparency which means sharing 
information with affected people. Then there is participation and informed consent which 
means listening to the affected people and making sure that they understand the 
humanitarian action process, and duty of care which refers to meeting the minimum 
standards of the affected people and ensuring their and the staff’s safety. The last three 
principles are offering redress (possibility to complain and responding to it), witness 
(reporting of the possible negative effects of other people’s actions for the affected people) 
and complementarity (working in co-operation with other aid agencies responsibly) (HAP 
2010).  
2.3.4. People In Aid, ALNAP and IATI 
People In Aid has created a Code of Good Practice which is a management tool for 
humanitarian agencies to improve the quality of their human resources management. The 
Code was drawn up between 1995 and 1997 as a Code of Best Practice but then revised 
again in 2003 when “best” was switched to “good”. It is an output of relief and 
development agencies including NGOs, international organizations, public sector and 
private sector firms. Unlike the previously presented standards, this is more focused on 
management. People are in the central of this Code as it believes that the success of 
humanitarian operations depend on the contributions of the staff and volunteers working in 
the humanitarian operation. The Code of Good Practice consists of seven principles and 
each of them follows the idea of the centrality of people to the organizational mission. It 
works as a tool in delivering effective human resource management. The seven principles 
therefore focus on human resources, training staff, managing and communication as well 
as health and safety of the staff (People In Aid 2003). 
The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action 
(ALNAP) was formed in 1997 as a consequence of the multi-agency evaluation of the 
genocide in Rwanda. The members of ALNAP are many, such as United Nations, Red 
Cross, Red Crescent movement, international organizations and NGOs, humanitarian 
networks and research institutes. ALNAP is a network dedicated to improving the 
accountability and performance of humanitarian action by strengthening the humanitarian 
evidence base. It provides a forum for humanitarian actors to display issues of 
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accountability and learning and produces research about the shared challenges among the 
humanitarian sector. Evaluation is one of ALNAP’s key strategic focus areas (ALNAP 
2014).  
International Aid Transparency Initiative was established in 2008 in Accra, Ghana. It is an 
initiative that aims to make the information about spending aid easier to find, use and 
compare. It is not actually a standard for humanitarian aid but it is also a tool to increase 
transparency of humanitarian aid. It aims at improved coordination of different 
organizations as the lack of coordination with other bodies is one of the problems in 
humanitarian aid. IATI has brought together developing country governments, donors, civil 
society and experts in aid to make a new international standard for publishing better 
information about aid. The aim of the initiative is to increase openness and transparency. 
Citizens in donor and developing countries lack information about the resources in order to 
hold their governments accountable of the use of the resources. IATI is especially useful 
for developing countries that face challenges finding up-to-date information about aid 
(IATI 2014).  
2.4. Sustainability and efficiency of assistance: bridging relief to development  
 
Basically, the core idea of humanitarian action is to provide short-term assistance that aims 
at saving lives in extreme crisis situations (Tamminga 2011). Critics have argued that on a 
longer term humanitarian assistance does not have any significant impact on changing the 
lives of people (Kopinak 2013). In contrast development projects aim at achieving long-
term changes by impacting structural issues such as alleviating poverty and promoting 
economic growth or changing the power relations. There seems to be a wide gap between 
these two camps: humanitarian assistance and development aid (Michael & Zwi 2002). 
Humanitarian crises are neither just short-term events that are easy to exit. The question is 
how to provide a change from humanitarian assistance to long-term development and how 
to integrate more developmental types of programs and activities to humanitarian 
responses in order to increase sustainability and development. Lately humanitarian actors 
have realized how important it is to integrate prevention, preparedness and DRR into the 
humanitarian response. The other important step is to link relief to rehabilitation and 
development. Some progress has been made among the humanitarian actors. Humanitarian 
assistance is no longer only distributing goods for the affected people but it also includes 
activities that promote early recovery, restore livelihoods and strengthen the local 
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capacities. However too many donors still think that humanitarian assistance is only short-
term help that does not have any longer term developmental goals. These kinds of 
approaches have negative effects on the humanitarian actors who cannot look for more 
sustainable ways of addressing the needs and reducing vulnerability. The other problem is 
that the transition from relief to recovery often falls off the gap between humanitarian and 
development funding and therefore does not receive any funding. The reasons for this are 
bureaucratic practices and aid being politicized (Tamminga 2011).  
Nevertheless, building local capacity and the resilience of local communities are good 
ways to start to make assistance more sustainable. Along with building resilience people 
gain more capacity to cope with the challenges such as poverty, disasters and climate 
change (Tamminga 2011; Kopinak 2013). 
Two significant challenges affecting the success of a humanitarian response have to do 
with the understanding of local economy and reliability of baseline figures (Kopinak 
2013). First, large amounts of aid are often needed in the surviving process from a disaster 
but in order to avoid aid dependency and increase sustainability it is important to get to 
know to the local economy and markets before making the decisions of the aid 
programmes. In this manner, the humanitarian staff gets to know which particular 
strategies are suitable for different groups. The local goods and services should be 
supported as early as possible. Also locals should be recruited to the humanitarian process 
as early as possible in order to increase the sustainability and effectiveness (Patrick 2011). 
A successful humanitarian response would help to build an economic structure that can be 
sustained when aid will no longer be distributed. If a false economy is drawn, it will be 
disastrous when the aid stops. Cash-for-work is one way of facilitating long-term 
livelihood recovery (Kopinak 2013). Cash-for-work in the relief process means employing 
local people into the recovery process. Most often that means cleaning the debris and 
construction work (NEDA 2013). Because of the physical nature of the work, women are 
not necessarily offered as much work to gain cash as men (ACT Alliance 2014b)  
One of the problems in building sustainable economic structure is that although there are 
theories about facilitating business enabling environment, those theories are lacking in the 
field of post-disaster environment. Among the humanitarian agencies experiences have 
been localized and therefore no conceptual knowledge has been formed. Yet again there is 
no international standard definition for post-disaster livelihood recovery either (Régnier et 
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al. 2008). The other challenge is the reliability of baseline population figures. In order to 
achieve an effective project, baseline study at the beginning of the intervention is 
extremely important. The most important sectors of the baseline study are demographics, 
culture, health and lifestyle of the target population. Through a baseline study, the 
monitoring of the program is easier (Kopinak 2013). 
Humanitarian and development programs should be planned together from the very 
beginning in order to make them work fluently. However there is no consensus whether the 
post-disaster economic rehabilitation should be closely associated with the actual 
development. Most humanitarian agencies want to work in the disaster area until the prior 
livelihood situation has been restored but it is problematic to assess the disaster damages 
and compare it to the prior situation. According to Régnier et al (2008) the division 
between development and humanitarian agencies should and could be challenged in 
developing countries where vulnerability predisposes natural hazards. 
2.5. Early recovery in post-disaster recovery 
 
The approach to humanitarian work where longer term development and more resilient 
communities are contributed is called early recovery. Early recovery is the recovery 
process that begins in a humanitarian setting. It should be integrated to all the humanitarian 
work in order to strengthen the local capacity, rebuild communities and integrate disaster 
risk reduction to the humanitarian programs. The aim for the early recovery approach is to 
reduce the vulnerability of the communities and to link the humanitarian work into 
development programs in order to reduce the need for future humanitarian interventions. 
Early recovery includes issues such as the restoration of livelihoods, housing, security, 
basic services, governance, reintegrating displaced populations and reducing dependence 
on relief. It also aims at increasing resilience and disaster preparedness, building capacity 
and addressing the risks that contributed to the disaster (UNDP 2014).   
2.5.1. Guidance note on early recovery 
In order to be able to discuss about the implementation of early recovery (research 
question 2) in the context of this study some guidelines are needed. The subject of early 
recovery is still evolving and therefore there are no international standards particularly for 
early recovery. Instead I will use the Guidance note on Early Recovery made by Cluster 
Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) which is primarily designed for UN 
colleagues and partners that are significant actors in the humanitarian field. The guidance 
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note is made for understanding the early recovery better and as well as to guide the early 
recovery activities. At present there are differences in the ways in which humanitarian 
actors are responding to crises therefore the guidance note tries to offer some basic 
guidance principles. In addition to this Guidance note I will refer to the early recovery, 
livelihoods and agriculture plan by the Philippines Humanitarian Country Team.  
The overall aim for early recovery is to build back better meaning restoring the national 
capacity to recover from the disaster and avoid relapses. Early recovery also aims at 
transferring from a short- or medium-term recovery to a long-term development 
framework. The sooner the recovery starts in the humanitarian process the better because it 
makes the recovery process more effective and shorter more likely. National government 
should be managing early recovery as soon as they have the capacity. Nevertheless this 
might take time if the crisis has destroyed the government structure badly. When 
government is managing early recovery, linking between recovery and longer term 
reconstruction should be easy and produce less duplication. One of the challenges of early 
recovery is that commonly there are a lot of organizations working together with the 
government and the process of early recovery becomes uncoordinated and duplications 
occur. The other challenge of early recovery is that it should be initiated in the early phase 
of humanitarian response when there will not necessarily be time for comprehensive needs 
assessments or engaging with all the stakeholders (CWGER 2008).  
The responsibility for early recovery is with humanitarian actors but in order to have a 
good transition to long-term development early recovery should be located on the context 
of development actors as well. Early recovery should be bridging the gap between 
humanitarian aid and longer term recovery and development.  In order to have successful 
shift from emergency phase to long-term recovery it is important to know how and when 
that shift will happen in advance (CWGER 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
Table 1. Guidelines for livelihoods and income (CWGER 2008). 
 
LIVELIHOODS AND INCOME 
 
 Rapid needs, impact and capacity assessments: focus on local livelihood opportunities and local 
economic resources 
 Clarify the pre-existing situation about agriculture, environment and economic activity 
 Updating household surveys (geospatial data) 
 Identify detrimental survival mechanisms  and provide cash grants or other social security for those 
who cannot work 
 Capacity building of emergency employment 
 Promote transfer of skills (such as the skills of the displaced or returnee people) 
 Implement emergency employment (clean up drives, reconstruction of community infrastructure, 
clearing out debris) 
 Promoting small enterprise recovery by business management trainings, financial assistance etc. 
 Restore remittance facilities 
 Provide and rebuild fishing boats and other fishing equipment 
 Restore damaged crops, provide seeds, tools and fertilizers, provide credit, promote diversification 
of food crops in order to improve nutrition 
 Rebuild flood control and irrigation systems 
 Rehabilitate productive assets such as animal health and management of natural resources 
 Supporting horticulture, home or school gardens 
 “Assess the use of natural resources as coping mechanisms in post-crisis situations to supplement 
normal forms of income, and recommend measures for sustainable management of resources, for 
reduced reliance on natural resources for income and for rehabilitating impacted areas” 
 
The guidance note has specific guidelines for all the sectors in early recovery, such as 
social services, displacement and reintegration, infrastructure and rule of law.  However I 
will present here more precisely those three sectors that I will be analyzing based on the 
experiences of the crisis-affected people. The sectors chosen - livelihoods and income 
(Table 1), shelter (Table 2) and natural disaster response (Table 3) – follow the focus of this 
study.  
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Table 2. Guidelines for shelter (CWGER 2008). 
 
SHELTER 
 
 Make an assessment of the damage, capacity and needs in the shelter sector 
 Alternative, environmentally sustainable and affordable building technologies and materials 
 Assess the capacity of the local suppliers and markets 
 Identify national building regulations 
 Support the kind of housing that integrates DRR, gender, vulnerability and tolerance 
 Provide demonstrative projects showing resilient construction forms 
 Train local carpenters in building disaster resistant building techniques 
 Build the capacity of local communities for building shelter and provide support for people 
with special needs 
 
Table 3. Guidelines for natural disaster response (CWGER 2008). 
 
NATURAL DISASTER RESPONSE 
 
 Conduct mapping activities and assessments of the damage at different sectors 
 Risk assessment at community level 
 Conduct risk reduction guidelines for the reconstruction initiatives 
 Provide a multi-hazard risk assessment to guide the reconstruction planning 
 Strengthen the ability to respond to the emergences at the local level 
 “Strengthen community-based early warning systems and increase community awareness of 
existing hazards” 
 
2.6. Disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation 
 
From relief and response the paradigm in humanitarian aid has shifted to vulnerability 
analysis and then to risk management including disaster risk reduction and resilience 
(Yodmani 2001). Disaster risk reduction is a term that has been used a lot lately in 
humanitarian sector. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is defined by UNISDR as ‘the 
systematic development and application of policies, strategies and practices to minimize 
vulnerabilities, hazards and the unfolding of disaster impacts throughout society, in the 
broad context of sustainable development’. Disaster risk reduction policies regard disasters 
as political and socio-economic in origin, not natural events, referring to the school of 
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thought that was created in 1970s. The aim of DRR is to create communities that are 
resilient towards disasters (Mercer 2010).  
Another concept that is popular in the field of disaster response is climate change 
adaptation (CCA). Albeit the fact that it has been scientifically proved that greenhouse gas 
emissions need to be reduced in order to slow down the climate change, the impacts of the 
climate change already exist at the local level. Therefore international policy discussions 
have started to focus on the need of ‘adapting’ to climate change. The concept of CCA is 
very widely used but generally it aims at reducing the vulnerability to expected outcomes 
of climate change. The CCA strategies exist at local, national and international level. The 
local level, which is the focus of this study, includes early warning systems, education and 
trainings, risk assessments, hazard resistant farming etc. There are varied opinions as to 
whether the concepts of DRR and CCA should be brought together as one concept in 
reducing the vulnerability of a community or if the differences of these two concepts 
should be better recognized (Mercer 2010).  
It is evident that investing in DRR and CCA prevent humanitarian damage but investing in 
them is also cost-effective. The funding of DRR comes from humanitarian assistance but 
there seems to be a consensus that both DRR and CCA should be integrated into 
development planning as well as climate change financing with the longer term impacts 
(GHA 2014; Mercer 2010). The integration of disaster risk reduction into recovery 
response is important due to the growing risks for vulnerable countries formed by climate 
change. As covering the basic needs of people in emergencies is the most important goal in 
a post-disaster situation, more emphasis and money should be directed at helping the 
communities to increase their capacities to encounter future disasters and mitigating the 
possible consequences. According to The Overseas Development Institute only 0.4 % of 
the international development aid has been used to disaster risk reduction, however 
Philippines was one the biggest recipients of international DRR financing during 1991–-
2010. Still the national financing by domestic governance is even 20 times more than the 
international financing being average $ 800 million dollars per year (Kellet & Caravani 
2013).  
In 2005 168 countries signed the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and committed to a 
plan to invest in disaster risk reduction. Since the agreement many countries established 
policies for disaster risk reduction, established early warning systems and increased the 
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level of preparedness. However the goals of HFA have not yet been achieved and the 
preparedness has not been brought into the focus of each country’s systems. Integrating 
climate change adaptation and risk reduction to humanitarian responses would be 
important so that the people could be helped both in short- and long-term (Turnbull et al. 
2013). The Hyogo Framework for Action expires in March 2015 and then it will be 
replaced by a new framework for DRR that will be agreed in Sendai, Japan (GHA 2014).  
2.6.1. Forms of community participation 
The international standards, particularly the Sphere project, emphasize the participation of 
communities and supporting local capacities in humanitarian response. There are different 
ways how communities can participate to disaster response and disaster risk management 
(Osti & Miyake 2011). Actually local people are nearly always the first responders of 
disaster in the emergency phase before the professional help arrives. According to Palen et 
al. (2007) the participation to the response often continues even after the formal 
humanitarian response has started. The affected communities provide each other food, 
shelter, and assistance in daily work, transportation and even employment.    
One significant scene of participation is in the post-disaster housing projects. It has been 
widely accepted by scholars, NGOs and policy makers that is both important and beneficial 
to let the community members participate in the housing projects. Nevertheless the concept 
of community participation in project environment does not have one clear meaning and 
the ways in which people can actually participate varies a lot. Community members can 
either merely be involved as labour force or preferably part of project management and 
decision-making. The ‘beneficiaries’ of a specific housing project can participate in making 
the decisions related to design, materials and building and even management and financing 
if they are offered proper briefing. When participation is more in-depth, the results in 
building process and outcomes are proven to be better (Davidson et al. 2006). However 
according to Davidson et al. (2006) the requisite level of participation rarely happens. 
Building the local capacity is one of the ways in which resilience to hazards and climate 
change adaptation can be increased, and disasters prevented. According to Allen (2006) 
capacity building aims at strengthening the social capital of the communities and 
individuals and empowering vulnerable people to cope and also to participate to policy. 
There are various ways for capacity building in terms of disaster preparedness. Allen 
(2006) suggests four ways, which are 1) raising the awareness of risks and vulnerabilities 
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2) mobilizing people for long-term disaster preparedness 3) accessing local resources and 
knowledge (such as labour and local materials) and 4) training and providing technical 
information. Additionally, capacity building tries to build the capacity of the local 
institutions to work independently.  
Community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM or CBDM, depending on the 
source) is one way of building the local capacity. It aims at reducing vulnerabilities and 
strengthening people’s capacity to cope with future hazards. CBDRM is a participatory and 
people-centered and bottom-up approach to disaster risk management. Community is in the 
heart of the process from the beginning. It starts from analysing the specific vulnerabilities 
and capacities of each community. CBDRM is linked to development programs: it aims at 
improving the living standards on a wider scale and it increases people’s empowerment 
providing better access to resources and participating in decision making. Community is 
always the key actor but also the primary beneficiary in in the disaster risk reduction 
process (Yodmani 2001; Osti & Miyake 2011). The benefit of CBDRM is that it decreases 
the dependence from outside support and empowers and strengthens the capacity of the 
community to recover from disasters quickly. Capacity building is an important way of 
building CBDRM, by building local awareness people in the community can understand 
their own risks and reduce the vulnerability and therefore they are be able to minimize the 
loss and damage (Osti & Miyake 2011).  
2.7. Disaster resilience 
 
The concept of resilience is actually a metaphor that originated from physics. However the 
same concept has later been applied to social sciences meaning the adaptive capacities of 
individuals, communities and larger societies (Norris et al. 2007). In Hyogo Framework for 
Action resilience is defined by UNISDR (2005) as ”the ability of individuals, communities 
and states and their institutions to absorb and recover from shocks, while positively 
adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term 
changes and uncertainty”. As part of the broader concept of resilience there exists a 
concept of disaster resilience. The Hyogo Framework for Action defines disaster resilience 
as the degree to which individuals as well as public and private sector are capable of 
learning from past disasters and reduce the risks to future risks at all levels (UNISDR 
2005). The ways in which communities, governments and civil society can be encouraged 
to create a supporting environment for building disaster resilience are varied, but include 
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such actions as local capacity building and ensuring the participation of everyone, 
especially vulnerable and marginalized groups (Turnbull et al. 2013). The three major 
global processes that are trying to stabilize the concept of resilience are Hyogo Framework 
for Action, post-2015 goals focusing on sustainable development and the new international 
climate change agreement. Due to its different nature resilience needs different funding 
compared to traditional humanitarian assistance, and it requires changes in policies and 
structures. In a best possible case resilience can act as a bridge between humanitarian and 
development aid (GHA 2014).  
2.7.1. Community disaster resilience 
In this thesis I will focus on community resilience as it applies to disasters. Community 
resilience has roughly the same definition as individual resilience but the concept of 
community has varied meanings. A community is often described as a unity with 
geographic boundaries that are made up of natural, social, economic and built 
environments that are all linked to each other in various ways (Norris et al. 2007). That 
above-mentioned description of a community will be employed in this study, and therefore 
a community in the empirical data is understood as one barangay.  
In order to build resilience in communities the local people should be engaged in risk 
reduction, be flexible towards unexpected situations, create participatory organizations, 
strengthen decision-making skills and confirm the functionality of information sharing and 
ensure more equal division of resources. The resilience should be seen as a process instead 
of an outcome. The level of resilience can be measured in the way and pace in which the 
community returns to the situation before the disaster. Nevertheless resilience does not 
mean that the community would not suffer from any stress, but instead a resilient 
community returns to functioning faster and the stress is only a passing phenomenon 
(Norris et al. 2007).  
The Figure 1 illustrates the idea of community resilience as a set of adaptive capacities that 
are linked to each other. There are four main points in the figure that are divided into 
subcategories. The first one is economic development that contains the equality of 
resources and the diversity of economic resources. The second box, information and 
communication consist of for instance good information sources and responsible media. 
The third box is community competence that deals with such issues as community 
empowerment and flexibility. The most important box in the figure is the last one, which is 
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social capital. I will emphasize the role of social capital in this study because it includes 
important characteristics for a geographical disaster study, such as attachment to place and 
sense of community. Also, as the topic of this study is approached from the perspective of 
crisis-affected people the role of social capital in resilience is particularly important (Norris 
et al. 2007).  
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The first subcategories of social capital in Figure 1 are received and perceived social 
support and informal ties. Received social support refers to the actual help that has been 
received, whereas perceived help refers to the idea that people believe that there is help 
available if they are in need. In a disaster situation social support, such as the ability to 
borrow money, the possibility to stay at other people’s house or sharing of vital goods, is 
particularly important. Social embeddedness or informal ties refer to the social 
relationships between people and the benefits that people gain from their social ties (Norris 
et al. 2007).  
The last three sub categories are citizen participation, sense of community and attachment 
to place. Whereas social support mainly stretches from family to friendships these three 
dimensions encompass largely the whole neighborhood and community. The sense of 
community is understood as a significant factor for community resilience. It means that 
people in one community have shared values and concerns, trustful relationships and 
respect for each other. A sense of community is a feeling where people belong to the same 
group together. An unexpected event, such as disaster may either strengthen or disrupt the 
sense of community among community members (Norris et al. 2007).  
On the other hand place attachment has more to do with the actual location of a place. It 
refers to the emotional ties to a place, such as city or a neighborhood. It does not refer so 
much to the connections to other people that live in the same place. Place attachment may 
be an essential factor in disaster recovery because natural disasters are spatial events and 
often cause damage in the natural environments. It is not rare that some people are 
displaced during or after a disaster and that might cause barriers for the community 
recovery. Actually, the role of place attachment is contradictory but most often it helps in a 
way that people in the community have a common will to rebuild the place again where 
they are deeply rooted (Norris et al. 2007).  
Citizen participation is the participation of people in organizations, such as neighborhood 
watches, resident associations and self-help groups. Participation has been seen vital in 
disaster resilience because it increases the community engagement of people. People are 
given opportunities, roles and responsibilities and the community improves its 
organizational structure (Norris et al. 2007).  
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2.8. Vulnerability in relation to disasters  
 
The IPCC report defines vulnerability as the “propensity or predisposition to be adversely 
affected” (Field et al. (eds) 2012) and Bolin & Stanford (1991, cit. Juntunen 2006) 
determine that “vulnerability refers to a lack of ability to deal with a hazard’s effects”. 
Vulnerability in relation to disasters has by many scholars been divided into physical and 
social vulnerability. Social vulnerability reflects individual’s, household’s or society’s 
capacity to tolerate the disasters. Gender, marginalized status, lack of information, lack of 
income, lack of transport and lack of knowledge can all promote social vulnerability. 
Instead poor housing, location and built environment are all factors contributing physical 
vulnerability (Levine et al 2007).  
According to Gaillard & Cadag (2009) the level of people’s vulnerability is defined by 
natural (natural resources such as water, land, forest, sea), human (health, knowledge, 
skills), social (social networks, participating to organizations and associations, good 
relationships), financial (cash, savings, access to credit), physical (housing, shelter, utensils 
at home, furniture, livestock etc.) and political capitals that all affect to the capacity of 
people to fulfill their basic needs. The last one, political capital, refers to interfacing with 
government and government-linked services, information and assets. The five capitals are 
defined by the Department of International Development (2001) whereas the sixth is an 
insertion by Gaillard and Cadag (2009) which I find required in this study. In terms of 
livelihoods, most of the times lack of livelihoods is not only because there are no 
livelihoods available but more on lack of capability and entitlement to use the resources 
(Wisner 2009, cit. Gaillard and Cadag 2009).  
Disaster victims are often marginalized in many different ways; they may belong to a 
minority, they are often poor, their political messages are neglected by the policy-makers 
and they live in hazardous places (Gaillard & Cadag 2009). Hazards themselves are not 
preventable but we can have an effect on vulnerability of the affected people by 
minimizing the losses and achieving efficient and sustainable recovery process. 
Marginalized populations living close to the survival level may have serious problems even 
after a small disaster. Zakour & Gillespie (2013) argue that for already socially and 
economically marginalized populations, the loss of social resources will have negative 
effects in the post-disaster situation. 
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Blaikie et al. (1994) was one of the first analyzing the significance of social, political and 
economic factors in disasters. They presented a model where the risk is only possible when 
both hazard and vulnerability occur:  
Risk = Hazard + Vulnerability 
They also presented two models that both measure the causes and susceptibility for a 
natural disaster. The first one is called PAR model which means pressure and release. It 
“shows how disasters occur when natural hazards affect vulnerable people” (Blaikie et al 
1994). 
 
Figure 2. PAR model shows how hazards and vulnerability form a disaster. 
In this model (Fig. 2) root causes are the primary causes that affect the disaster.  Root 
causes are often linked to political or economic systems or they might be limitations in 
access to resources for some people. They are also linked to unequal power relations in the 
societies. Root causes are channeled to unsafe conditions trough dynamic pressures. 
Dynamic pressures are dependent on the type of the hazard, but for instance urbanization, 
population growth and deforestation are dynamic pressures. Land degradation is one of the 
biggest dynamic pressure which includes degradation of forests, wetlands and water. Land 
degradation often happens as a consequence of the political and economic systems (root 
cause) where the government wants to use land for commercial cropping or tourism.  From 
dynamic pressures the model moves on to unsafe conditions. Rapid urbanization increases 
vulnerability especially for poor people that move to squatter settlements. Decreased 
means of income force people to move into cities but with the cities being overcrowded 
people most often need to move to areas that are unsecure and susceptible for risks (flood 
prone areas, steep hills etc.). These dangerous locations and unprotected buildings are 
examples of the unsafe conditions.  Also un-preparedness for disaster by public sector 
together with vulnerable society and economic factors (low income) are part of unsafe 
conditions. With unsafe conditions there is a high risk for a disaster which takes place 
when the hazard occurs (Blaikie et al 1994).  
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The other model by Blaikie et al. (1994) is called access model and it takes a deeper look 
at the political and economic processes that contribute to vulnerability trying to analyze 
how the conditions should be changed to decrease vulnerability. Access itself means the 
ability to use resources that are needed to have a safe livelihood.  According to Blaikie (et 
al 1994) resources are divided in three sectors: natural resources (assets, land), 
physiological and social resources (health, education) and financial resources (income, 
market access). Simplified, the model claims that less access to resources means increased 
vulnerability. Also in this model class and power issues are the most determining factors in 
the access for resources.  
According to Oxfam International (2005) natural disasters do not affect everyone evenly 
but instead they are discriminatory. In every disaster “pre-existing structures and social 
conditions determine that some member of the community will be less affected while 
others pay a higher price” (Oxfam International 2005:1). If the respondents of the 
humanitarian aid are differentiated by vulnerability, the effectiveness of the aid will 
increase.  
2.9. Humanitarian aid and power relations 
 
Although humanitarian aid aims to improve the living conditions of people in the disaster 
situation it cannot be taken for granted that aid would not constitute inequality in one way 
or another. Previous studies from post-disaster reconstruction have revealed that 
humanitarian aid does not only promote equality but it creates inequality relating to how 
the aid is distributed. It has been proved that humanitarian aid has created a battle of the 
donors’ money that changes the power relations within the recipients (Ivarsson 2013). 
Despite the impartial mission of humanitarian aid, power relations and the question of 
inequality are very much present in the aftermath of a disaster and the humanitarian aid.  
Benedikt Korf (2007) presented in his article about Moral geographies and post-tsunami 
aid in Southeast Asia that recipients of humanitarian aid in 2004 tsunami were reduced to 
passive observers and pure victims. In natural disasters the “victims” are even “purer” 
victims than in civil wars or development aid because in the latter two the threat is more 
often produced by people instead of nature. Korf also presented a critical thought about the 
idea of donors that give aid from generosity towards the victims. He thinks that instead 
there are hidden expectations of getting something in return. The recipients of aid are 
always waiting for the recipients to express gratefulness for the generosity of donors.  
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In traditional societies gift giving has been dependent on reciprocity. Marshal Sahlins 
(1972) has presented an idea of negative reciprocity which happens when there is a larger 
social divide and recipients will not most probably become donors in the near future.  That 
strengthens the social hierarchy between countries. Hattori (2001) has taken this idea 
further and calls foreign aid as negative, unreciprocated gift. This reasserts the Western 
domination towards the Global South. Instead of pure generosity, the gift (material or 
monetary aid) giving might become a tool for power and domination serving the interests 
of a donor instead of the recipient in need.  Barnett 2005 (cit. Korf 2007) argues that the 
gift can never be pure gift because it is always connected to a” larger economy of debt and 
obligation”. Transforming the domination into generosity and gratitude makes gift giving 
look like an act of pure altruism towards the suffering people. Korf (2007) argues that the 
forced gratefulness of the recipient produces a humiliating situation for the recipient. When 
donor expects something back from the recipients the gift is not unconditional.  
After the Southeast Asian tsunami international donors and especially the public in West 
were eager to see how their aid has been materialized in tsunami hit areas. They wanted to 
see pictures of new schools and houses, new fishing boats and people with happy and 
grateful faces. The expectations will therefore have an impact on the aid; it will no longer 
be based on the actual needs but more on the expectations that the public has from the 
humanitarian actors. The aid organizations need to build their brands and therefore images 
of gift giving situations are important also for the aid agencies’ brand building. Often these 
kinds of images and the media produce an idea that foreign organizations are the ones that 
are fixing the post-disaster situation and local actors are downplayed. These factors also 
diminish the power of local people to express their needs and make them excluded from 
the recovery process. When international actors are more responsible towards their own 
organizations than the beneficiaries, the aid is often unequally distributed (Korf 2007).  
3. Post-disaster recovery in the Philippines’ context 
At the time I conducted the field work, relief activities had transitioned to early recovery. 
The challenge in that phase is to ensure that affected communities will get adequate 
support to rebuild their livelihoods and to gain resilience to face future disasters (ACT 
Alliance 2014c). In this chapter I will first introduce the country context that defines the 
background for Haiyan and its impacts for the society. Then I will move on to presenting 
the impacts of the typhoon more precisely. The third sub chapter covers the reconstruction 
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and recovery plans for Haiyan and lastly I will move on to the disaster response and 
introducing the field research areas and the projects.  
3.1. Country context 
 
Below I will shortly introduce the natural environment and the political context of the 
society where the disaster took place.  
3.1.1. Natural environment and National Disaster Risk Reduction 
Philippines is one of the hotspot countries in the world when it comes to natural disasters. 
It experiences about twenty typhoons and storms every year. The country is an archipelago 
with more than 7000 islands and many coastal cities and it is located at the western rim of 
the Pacific along the seismic belt. The Philippines is threatened by floods, storms, 
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, typhoons and droughts. Parts of the country are densely 
populated which makes people more vulnerable to hazards. Additionally, coastal living and 
growing urbanization increases the vulnerability (World Bank 2009; HCT 2013). Just less 
than a month before Haiyan 7.2 magnitude earthquake hit the island of Bohol in the 
Philippines affecting 1.3 million people. Again one year before Haiyan in December 2012 
a disastrous typhoon Bopha passed the southern parts of Philippines affecting northern 
Mindanao, central Visayas and Palawan causing an emergency in the country (OCHA 
2013; OCHA 2014). Continual natural disasters make the country and its inhabitants very 
vulnerable.  
Long-term changes in natural disasters are not easy to measure because of their rarity, but 
there is some evidence of the changes in their intensity and frequency. According to IPCC 
there is low confidence that tropical cyclones are becoming more frequent but it is likely 
that the tropical cyclone maximum wind speed will increase in some regions which means 
increase in storm intensity. Heavy precipitations are likely to increase, although there are 
wide regional differences. It is challenging to measure the human impact on the frequency 
of tropical cyclones or other single extreme events, although many people believe there is a 
strong causal relationship (Field et al. (eds.) 2012). 
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council was established in the 
Philippines in 2009. It consists of various groups including government, non-government, 
civil and private sector organizations and it is responsible for protecting people and their 
welfare in disasters and emergencies. The Philippine Climate Change Act of 2009 and 
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Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (2010) are the two most significant national 
policies guiding the disaster management. The latter act defines post-disaster recovery as 
the ‘restoration and improvement, where appropriate, of the facilities and livelihood and 
living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk 
factors, in accordance with the principles of ‘build back better’’ whereas build back better 
refers to vulnerability (HCT 2014). 
Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is based on the national disaster risk reduction 
and management plan (NDRRMP) made for years 2011 to 2028. The plan emphasizes 
mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation by increasing 
governance in areas of environment, agriculture, water, energy, urban planning, poverty 
reduction etc. The plan also highlights institutionalizing DRR policies and mechanisms at 
the national and local level. The plan wants to make effort in strengthening good 
governance in poverty alleviation and environmental protection by engaging the 
participation of different sectors, such as CSOs, private sector and volunteers. NDRRMP 
admits that the paradigm change from “disasters as an immediate product of hazards” has 
not yet been successfully switched towards “disasters as a function of people’s 
vulnerability” but the country’s DRR is moving towards it (NDRRMC 2011). 
3.1.2. Inequality, political challenges and colonial history 
Income distribution in the Philippines is highly uneven. The wealth of the country is 
focused on the Northern island of Luzon when other island groups Visayas and Mindanao 
are in much weaker position (Fig. 3). Especially the Eastern Visayas region that is the 
research area of this study is one of the areas with lowest incomes. The areas affected by 
the typhoon had a poverty rate (people under poverty line) of 30.5 % in 2012. It ranged 
from 22.7 % in Cebu province to 63.7 % in Eastern Samar. However poverty has increased 
and will continue to increase in typhoon affected areas because of the upsurge in 
unemployment, rapid rise in food prices and reduction in local economies. According to 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) the poverty rate of Eastern Visayas might rise up to 55.7 
% from the earlier 41.2 % (NEDA 2013) as a consequence of the typhoon. Lots of people 
in Philippines are dependent on remittances from more than 2.2 million overseas Filipinos 
(Philippine Statistics Authority 2012). 
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Figure 3. Average annual family income by region in year 2012. Data from: Philippine 
Statistics Authority (2013). 
Philippines is a multiparty democracy by President Benigno S. Aquino who III has gained 
popularity mainly because of the economic growth of the country in the last couple of 
years. Critical writers claim Philippine government and its politics on corruption and 
domination of certain families. The further challenges in country’s political situation are 
poverty, corruption, state weakness and electoral irregularities. Jennifer Keister (2013) 
argued that humanitarian aid supplies are sometimes required to go through local 
politicians which may cause misuse of the aid money, such as distributing the assistance to 
political supporters and family members to promote the interests of the people in power.  
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Both Spain and USA have been the colonial powers of Philippines before it finally got 
independence in 1946 (BBC 2013). The colonial history has an impact on humanitarian 
aid; former colonial powers are more likely to donate aid to their former colonies. Colonial 
history also has an impact on the amount of aid which is 46 % higher for countries with 
colonial ties (Strömberg 2007). USA has donated 10,7 % of the grand total aid money to 
Philippines (Financial Tracking Service 2015) after the disaster thus the aid is not 
necessarily only made to address the need of Philippines but to further the foreign political 
interests of the USA. 
3.2. The impact of the disaster 
 
The extremely powerful tropical cyclone Hayian (locally called Yolanda) struck Visayas 
(Fig. 4) an island group located in central Philippines, the 8th of November 2013. The 
typhoon made its first landfall in Guiuan, the province of Eastern Samar and carried on to 
Tacloban City, the province of Leyte, Daanbantayan and Bantayan Island, the province of 
Cebu, Conception, the province of Iloilo and Busuaga in Palawan islands (ILO 2013). 
Haiyan reached the island of Leyte with nearly 315 kilometers per hour wind speed and 
enormous waves. In Tacloban, which was one of the worst hit cities, the wind blew water 
on the shore up to 7.5 meters high. Whilst most of the city is only five meters above sea 
level the disaster was tremendous. Haiyan, equivalent to the highest category (5) in US 
Saffir-Simpson scale for hurricanes, was probably the most powerful tropical cyclone that 
has ever landed with such high wind speed. Apart from wind and storm surges heavy rains 
also swept through the central Philippines causing more damage (Gutro 2013).  
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Figure 4. Typhoon Haiyan: Distance from the typhoon path (REACH Resource Centre 2013). 
The impacts of Haiyan were the heaviest in economic and social sectors that constituted 93 
% of the total damage. Table 4 shows the main impacts of the typhoon more precisely. 
Approximately 90 % of the total damage focused on the private sector while only 10 % 
focused on public sector. Agricultural land was destroyed, including palay (rice) and corn 
plantations together with millions of damaged coconut trees. Fishers lost their assets and 
buildings were destroyed causing damage to service and business industry practiced at the 
region. Almost half of all the estimated 5.9 million affected workers were in a vulnerable 
employment before the disaster indicating that they were working in very poor conditions 
and they did not have any kind of social protection. Of the 14 million affected people 40 % 
were living below poverty line before the typhoon strike. People who lost their livelihoods 
are remarkably vulnerable and living in uncertainty (OCHA Philippines 2014; ILO 2013; 
NEDA 2013; HCT 2014). The areas that were affected severely by the typhoon are 
important agricultural areas. According to the Early Recovery Plan (2014) the income 
earnings were cut in half and the number of people looking for work in the cities increased 
by 10 %.  
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Table 4. The impacts of typhoon Haiyan (UN OCHA 2013, HCT 2014) 
 
 
3.3. Reconstruction and recovery plans 
 
Two reconstruction plans complementary to each others were made in the aftermath of the 
disaster. First one is the government’s strategic plan and the second is made for 
international organizations and NGOs to complement the government’s plan. In addition I 
will introduce the Early Recovery, Livelihoods and Agriculture Plan by Philippines 
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) that focuses particularly to the issue of early recovery. 
HCT is a composition of organizations that do humanitarian work in the Philippines and 
commit to cooperation, such as key UN agencies, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), NGOs and international humanitarian agencies (HCT 2010). The 
following three plans I found the most important and central in guiding the recovery and 
reconstruction of typhoon Haiyan.  
3.3.1. The Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) 
The Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) is the Government’s “strategic plan to 
guide the recovery and reconstruction of the economy, lives, and livelihoods in the affected 
areas”. It aims at reconstructing the pre-existing conditions and improving the disaster 
preparedness. RAY outputs include different sectors of society; infrastructure, housing, 
facilities, support for social and environmental issues and assistance with livelihoods and 
employment.  
The three main sources of living in the Visayas region are agriculture, fisheries and 
tourism. In addition to these, industry and service sector in Visayas include retailing, 
Number of people affected 14.1 million or 15 % of the 
total population 
Number of casualties 6092 
Number of injured people 26 231 
Number of missing people 1791 
Number of internally displaced people 4.1 million 
Number of children < 5 years suffering from malnutrition >40 000 
Number of people required live-saving food assistance 2.5 million 
Number of workers that lost their livelihoods 5.9 million 
Number of damaged houses 1 127 041  
Number of damaged classrooms  16 800 
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trading, manufacturing, agricultural production and cottage and craft industries. According 
to RAY, majority of the people that lost their livelihoods are marginalized people: 
fishermen and farmers (especially coconut farmers) and some service sector workers. RAY 
aims at conducting special help to these most vulnerable groups. The supportive activities 
for agricultural workers mentioned in RAY would be clearing the plantations and fields, 
providing assistance to establish new fields, providing seeds, fertilizers and tractors, 
developing alternative livelihoods, and providing fishermen commodities and material to 
reconstruct their damaged boats and other assets. Major fishing zones in the region rely on 
coral reefs which are now badly damaged and therefore need to be taken into consideration 
when designing the recovery of both the environment and the livelihoods of the fishermen. 
RAY also mentions emergency employment e.g. cash-for-work and public work programs 
that will be implemented among the vulnerable people. After emergency employment the 
plan is to make a shift towards sustainable livelihoods using micro-credits or community-
based grants. RAY also plans to help by supporting recovery and reconstruction of housing 
and shelter (NEDA 2013). 
Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda highlights the government’s responsibility in 
recovery and reconstruction implementation in spite of the cooperation and common goals 
with international organizations. Most of the recovery plans are targeted to be completed in 
1-2 years but according to earlier disasters it has been noticed that some activities might 
take up to 4 years (NEDA 2013) 
3.3.2. Strategic Response Plan (SPR) 
The Strategic Response Plan (SRP) was designed to complement the Government of the 
Philippines’ plan RAY in responding the humanitarian needs of people affected by Haiyan. 
The Plan is prepared by the Philippines Humanitarian Country Team. 14 UN organizations 
and 39 NGOs and international organizations are included is SPR which is designed for 12 
months starting from the date of the typhoon landfall in Philippines. The plan aims at 
targeting three million people with direct assistance through different programs such as 
food security and agriculture cluster interventions. In addition the plan aims at benefitting 
more than 7 million people with support to health services and 5 million people with 
protection-related activities (HCT 2013). 
There are five strategic objectives in SPR. The objectives are to satisfy the immediate food 
needs and to provide food security, provide protective shelters for families without home, 
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offer self-sufficiency for people that have lost their jobs or livelihoods, provide access to 
safe water, sanitation and good hygiene and therefore prevent communicable diseases, and 
rapidly gain people’s access back to local services such as education. The priority actions 
of the Strategic Response Plan are presented in Table 5. The plan wants to target the most 
vulnerable people and therefore continuously collects data about gender and age (HCT 
2013).  
Table 5. The priority actions of Strategic Response Plan (HCT 2013). 
 
THE ACTION PLAN OF SPR 
 
 Shelter aid: shelter material, tools, Cash-for-Work, technical training and site management 
in evacuation centers  
 Food assistance, nutritional support and agricultural inputs  
 Waste removal from public spaces and recycling all the possible material for reconstruction 
 Reconstructing water and sanitation systems 
 “Support restarting of Local Government Units “ 
 Ensuring restarting of livelihoods 
 Providing access to health services 
 Restarting education 
 Strengthening of government’s protection to prevent violence and protect vulnerable 
people 
 
3.3.3. Early Recovery, Livelihoods and Agriculture plan 
Philippines Humanitarian Country Team prepared a plan for early recovery for the time 
period from March 2014 until November 2014. The plan aims at filling the gap after the 
immediate emergency help and the longer term development programs. The other aim for 
this plan is to improve the disaster preparedness. The four priority actions of the early 
recovery, livelihoods and agriculture plan are 1) Waste management and debris clearance 
2) Livelihood support 3) Supporting the local government units (LGU) in disaster 
management and 4) improving disaster preparedness and ensuring a smooth transition from 
early recovery to recovery. In Table 6 I will present actions planned for livelihood more 
precisely since livelihood sector is in focus of this study (HCT 2014). 
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Table 6. Planned actions for livelihood in Early recovery, Livelihoods and Agriculture Plan 
(HCT 2014). 
Fisheries Coconut farmers Non-agriculture livelihoods 
 Restoration of fishing 
boats and gear 
 Inputs and materials for 
seaweed farming 
 Restoring the 
livelihoods of women 
fishers 
 Rehabilitation of 
mangrove forests (using 
CfW in replanting) 
 Intensification and 
diversification of 
coconut areas 
 Providing equipment 
for farming 
 Integrating soil 
conservation 
technologies 
 Providing 
livestock/poultry 
 Supporting backyard 
vegetable production 
 Supporting communal 
enterprises 
 Developing a 
community food system 
 Establishing 
community-based plant 
nurseries 
 Rapid rehabilitation of 
the affected urban 
economic infrastructure 
 Skills training to restore 
the pre-Haiyan 
livelihood activities 
 
The fourth action considering disaster preparedness and early recovery aims at ensuring 
that communities are safe and resilient and confident in facing natural hazards in the long 
term. In addition to providing shelter and restoring the economic means the sections of 
inclusive growth, governance, gender equality, environment and DRR should be included 
in the early recovery approach.  
3.4. The disaster response 
 
Year 2013, when typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines, was globally dramatic in terms of 
disasters. The number of humanitarian crisis rose and the international humanitarian 
response was stretched (GHA 2014). To date the total humanitarian assistance by foreign 
donors (including private individuals and organizations) has been 843 711 489 that 
includes both contributions and commitments (Financial Tracking Service 2015). A little 
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more than a half of the assistance is allocated to the Strategic Response Plan introduced 
earlier.  
In addition to foreign humanitarian donations local and national recourses played a 
significant role in disaster response. It has been suggested that the government of the 
Philippines contributed DRR US$710 million to the disaster response, more than five times 
than the international humanitarian assistance in 2012. However the total foreign funding 
for typhoon Haiyan in 2013 has exceeded the domestic contributions.  
Both domestic and international humanitarian assistance are only a part of the help 
received by crisis-affected people. Remittances are very important source of money in the 
Philippines and in three months after typhoon Haiyan the country reached US$6.7 billion 
in remittances. Obviously all this money is not directed for the Haiyan response however 
there was a large increase in volume. Often remittances are overlooked as part of the 
humanitarian aid however globally the Philippines is the third largest remittance recipient. 
Also private sector increased its role in disaster response. As well as donating money 
private sector worked increasingly in providing goods and services and developing new 
services and approaches for the crisis-affected communities (Overseas Development 
Institute 2014). Among the big private donors were companies such as IKEA, Coca-Cola 
and HSBC (Win 2013).  
The role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the relief and recovery 
operations in the case of Haiyan has not been specifically strong. The donations of 
$500,000 through ASEAN remained minor compared to the total donations in 
humanitarian assistance. It is not easy to estimate exactly what has been the role of 
ASEAN regarding to the relief and reconstruction but ASEAN supported Philippines 
mainly by establishing some initial communication links and by facilitating coordination 
(Fan & Krebs 2014).  
The immediate relief phase of Haiyan was carried out rather well. The challenge in the 
beginning was with the logistics when the airstrips, ports and roads were badly damaged 
(WHO 2013). The way in which disaster response was organized by UN was using cluster 
approach that aims at increasing cooperation between the organizations. Clusters are 
groups of humanitarian organizations that work on one sector in emergency relief, such as 
WASH, shelter and agriculture. Each cluster is led by a leading agency, and for early 
recovery rhe leading agency is the UN Development Programme (Tran 2014a).  
 38 
 
 
3.5. Introduction to the field research areas and the projects  
 
 Figure 5. The location of Samar province in Philippines. 
 
The case study area consists of three barangays, Salvacion, Sawa and Ferreras, that belong 
to the province of Samar (Fig. 5) in Eastern Visayas (Region VIII) which is part of the 
Visayas group of islands. The people in Eastern Visayas belong to the Waray ethno-
linguistic group and their native language is Waray-Waray. The people living in the island 
of Samar are called Samareños and the dominant religion is Roman Catholic. The main 
economic activities in Samar are agriculture and fishing. The major crops produced in the 
province are coconut, banana, palay (rice), corn, cassava, camote, gabi and pineapple. 90 
% of Samareños are dependent on rice in their food intake (Samar News 2012).  
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The word barangay is a local word that means a village in rural areas or a district in urban 
areas, and officially it is the lowest formal tier of the local government system (Allen 
2006). The locations of the study areas are presented in Figure 6. The first two barangays, 
Salvacion and Sawa are both located in the municipality of Basey. Geographically 
barangay Salvacion is located on the island of Jinamoc. Sawa is located in the outlying 
area of the municipality of Basey. The third barangay Ferreras belongs to the municipality 
of Marabut and is located on the coast. The total population in Basey is 50,423 (in 2010) 
and it has 51 barangays. The total population in Marabut amounted 15,115 in 2010 and 
Marabut consists of 24 barangays (Philippine Statistics Authority 2010). The populations 
of the barangays are presented in Table 7.  
 
Figure 6. The location of three study areas. 
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Table 7. The population of the study areas in 2010 (Philippine Statistics Authority 2010).  
Barangay Population (in 2010) 
Salvacion 1502 
Sawa 986 
Ferreras 417 
 
I chose three barangays for this case in order to be able to view the possible differences in 
the distribution and division of aid and to analyse if the location made any significant 
impact on the assistance people received. Salvacion is located on a small island that is only 
accessible by an outrigger canoe (bangka), however the distance from the main island is 
only about 1.2 km. Sawa is located in remote area and it is not upon the highway nor does 
it have a coast line. Ferreras is a small mainly fisher village located on the coast along San 
Pedro Bay. I chose these three areas also for a more practical reason since they belong to 
the program areas of the contact organization.  
Typhoon Haiyan hit western Samar badly and the damage was severe. In the Western coast 
the damage was mainly caused by the high winds as well as water damage and subsequent 
rains. The high winds destroyed roofs and structures of the houses. The Western coastline 
of Samar has one of the highest proportions of severely food insecure households and the 
typhoon caused damage to cropland and coconut trees. The fishing communities suffered 
high asset and livelihood loss (HCT 2014). One of the main sources of income in the 
typhoon hit areas included coconut farming (Fig. 7) and Region VIII was a major coconut 
producer in the country before the typhoon. However most of the coconuts were cut off 
which meant devastating loss in livelihoods (Tran 2014b). Coconut farmers are in 
specifically vulnerable situation because it takes six to eight years for the newly planted 
coconut trees to grow back and therefore many years to earn living from coconut farming 
(NEDA 2013).  
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Figure 7. Coconut production by region in 2010 before the typhoon impacts. Data from: 
Philippine Statistics Authority (2011). 
As mentioned earlier the contact organization NCCP ACT Alliance had on-going projects 
in these three study areas of this research. The most visible projects of the organization 
were in shelter and livelihood sectors. They also worked in the emergency phase 
distributing goods. Total of 309 shelters were targeted to be built in Salvacion, 116 in Sawa 
and 98 in Ferreras. The livelihood projects included distributing rice and vegetable seeds, 
coconuts, boats, egg laying and pig farming however the livelihood projects varied 
according to a barangay.  
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4. METHODOLOGY 
This research is a qualitative research and the methodology for this study follows the 
structuralist apprcoah. The aim of a structuralist research is to examine the impact of 
political structures on individuals. Structuralism aims to explain phenomena but not only 
according to what is available to see but also according to the non-available structural 
reasons. Structuralism tries to point out the harmful structures that limit the functionality in 
societies. The scientific philosophy of structuralism is realism which means that social 
issues are real regardless of the consciousness of a person. The research of social structures 
is tied to time and place because social structures can change with time. Structural research 
unlike some other scientific methodologies pays attention to the relation of theory and 
practice because it does not only try to understand but it tries to raise social evils (Häkli 
1999). Also the methods define the methodology of this research because qualitative 
interview is structuralist rather that positivist (Gubrium and Holstein 2002). 
The knowledge interest of structuralism presented by Habermas (1978, cit. Häkli 1999) is 
critical (or liberating). It will also be the knowledge interest in this research. Critical 
knowledge interest is based on an assumption that power relations have become similar to 
natural events. In practice this means that people who live under societal subjugation do 
not know the real nature of power relations. In reality power relations can be changed 
because they are formed by people and not by nature or biology. Critical knowledge 
interest is linked to research that aims to free people from subjugating power relations by 
increasing their awareness of their rights (Häkli 1999: 31-35). 
4.1. Research methods in the field 
 
This thesis was conducted as a qualitative case study and the approach for this study can be 
called semi-ethnographic. Humanistic geographers have used ethnographic methods since 
1970s in order to understand the social and cultural processes better (Crang & Cook 
2007:7-17).  Ethnography is a method that is dependent on direct observation that is done 
on the field. In ethnographic research the researcher should pay special attention to 
behavior, social structures and their meanings for the studied group of people (Hay 2010). 
Ethnographic researcher should also keep in mind the equality between the researcher and 
the researched (Crang & Cook 2007:7-17). However I observed three different barangays 
in a period for only three weeks which is way too short time to become part of the 
communities. Therefore this study is not a fully ethnographic study although some 
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ethnographic methods were used (observation, interview) in order to involve the locals. 
Ethnographic research requires the researcher to be closely involved with the studied group 
of people, and although I stayed in the barangays living closely with the studied people the 
time was not enough to create relations with them.  
However I shared some community activities with the barangays residents while I was 
doing the field work, which argues my claim for this study having some ethnographic 
characteristics. During my time in the barangays I stayed with the local residents who 
kindly let me and the interpreter to stay at their homes. Usually it was some of the 
barangay officials that hosted us because they had bigger houses. The people in the 
barangays were very hospitable and wanted to make me feel comfortable even though I 
tried to emphasize that there is no need for anything extraordinary. However staying with 
the locals enabled me to take part in their daily activities such as playing with the kids, 
having conversations with the people, eating together, having dinner parties and doing 
some domestic tasks such as collecting water from the well. I also took part in the religious 
activities by joining a ceremony in a church. During my time on the field I was also invited 
to take part in the Haiyan commemoration day and its preparation activities which gave me 
a possibility to actually share something meaningful with the local people. Of course 
though, I remained as an outsider because everyone else had shared the same experience a 
year ago except me. 
I conducted the field research between 27th October and 16th November 2014 with the 
help of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) ACT Alliance. ACT 
Alliance stands for a coalition of more than 140 churches and affiliated organizations that 
work together in the fields of humanitarian aid, development and advocacy (ACT Alliance 
2015). Finn Church Aid is also a member of ACT Alliance and through FCA I was able to 
contact NCCP before entering the field. They provided me an entry point to the research 
areas as well as helped me to find a local interpreter to hire. However it was made clear for 
the respondents of this study that I was only making this research and not working for 
NCCP ACT Alliance. Therefore I was not providing any humanitarian or development 
assistance as this would sometimes cause misunderstandings. Although the results of this 
study will be assigned for the use of NCCP ACT Alliance in order for them to improve 
their activities as this was the first really large humanitarian operation for the organization 
with a large amount of donations.  
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The first challenge in this work was to create networks with local organization before 
entering the field. It is not possible to conduct field work without a proper guide that can 
provide an access to the areas (Crang & Cook 2007). Since the research area was not 
familiar to me before and I knew I had such a limited time to spend on the field I had to 
create the contacts before and make sure everything would start as soon as I get there. I 
tried to confirm the practical issues beforehand however many issues had to be confirmed 
on the field. Making the research in a developing country that has just gone through a 
natural disaster brings its own challenges for doing field work. Luckily everything went 
smoothly and the local organization helped me to start as soon as I arrived to Tacloban. 
I visited all three research areas to introduce myself for the key persons in the barangays 
before starting the interviews. They key people informed the tenants in the barangays that I 
was coming so that they knew why I was doing the interviews. I also had a local interpreter 
with me all the time and he was able to explain the motives for doing the interviews in the 
local language. As I do not speak Waray-Waray I had to trust the word of my interpreter. 
This has to be taken to account in case of possible misunderstandings. However that 
enabled people to talk in their mother tongue which further made it easier to talk about 
things in more detail.  
The primary data collection method was individual semi-structured interview. I also 
conducted group discussions and key informant interviews, did participant observation and 
collected GPS points as supportive and questioning methods. I used several methods as a 
means of triangulation in order to maximize the understanding of the research topic. 
According to Longhurst (2003) researchers often use many different perspectives to collect 
and analyse data. All methods used are presented in Table 8.  
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Table 8. The methods used for this study. 
Method: Sample size:  Aim: 
Individual semi-structured 
interviews 
34 individual interviews The primary method. 
Understanding the 
impact of the typhoon 
and humanitarian 
response in the everyday 
lives of the respondents 
and getting results to the 
research questions.  
Group discussions 3 group discussions (one in each 
barangay) 
To obtain information 
from people in groups. 
Key informant interviews 5 key informants To gain a deeper 
understanding of the 
humanitarian response 
and the different aspects 
in the work of the 
humanitarian agencies.  
Participant/field observation Continuously To understand people’s 
everyday life. 
GPS points GPS points covering the 3 barangay 
areas.  
The aim was to ensure 
the spatial balance with 
house-to-house 
interviews.  
 
4.1.1 Semi-structured interview 
The main method on the field was individual semi-structured interview with crisis-affected 
people from house to house. The total number of the interviews I conducted individually 
was 34. Nine interviews were conducted in Salvacion, 12 in Sawa and 13 in Ferreras. The 
reason for conducting different amount of interviews in each barangay was mainly 
depending on the logistical issues. I was able to spend less time in Salvacion and make 
fewer interviews because people were preparing for the commemoration day of typhoon 
Haiyan which made them busy.  
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Semi-structured interviews are one of the most used qualitative methods in geography 
(Longhurst 2003). Semi-structured interview type means that questions of the interview 
have been designed before and they will be presented more or less in the same order 
(Hirsjärvi & Hurme 200: 47). Interviews are usually pointed to strangers whose individual 
experiences and thoughts are seen useful for a research. Interview is a way to observe 
something that we are not able to see, where we cannot go or situations that we have not 
undergone. The aim for a qualitative interview is to derive interpretations, not to produce 
facts or test laws (Gubrium & Holstein 2002). When designing a qualitative interview, it is 
important to get to know the earlier literature of the topic in order to see if the new 
qualitative interview would bring anything new to it. If we want to know about the unique 
experiences of the individual, there is no other way of doing it than giving that person a 
possibility to tell his/hers own story. It is highly a subjective vision and it is told by the 
construction of the participants’ realities. When we hear the whole story, it is much easier 
to see the context and recognize the meanings (Gubrium & Holstein 2002).  
The issue of power should not be ignored in the interview situations where the respondents 
may think that the researcher has the power over the situation. On the other hand, power 
relations may change when the respondents are given the chance to determine the place of 
the interview, who else they want to be there and what information they want to share 
(Merriam et al 2010:413). My aim was to produce a reliable situation where the 
participants could feel safe to express their feelings and tell their stories because the 
subject is rather sensitive and the past events may bring bad memories into the minds of 
the crisis-affected people. However this was not always possible due to the time limit 
which made it impossible to get to know to the people and to create trust before the 
interview. The situation required flexibility both from me, the respondent and the 
interpreter.  
Although the interviews were supposed to be conducted individually in order to let the 
people speak out freely sometimes there were other people that took part in the interview. 
Usually they were family members, other relatives or neighbors that became curious and 
wanted to join the conversation or at least listen to it. Crang and Cook (2007) explain that 
this is a common phenomenon in a (semi-)ethnographic research. Usually that was only an 
advantage for the research because interviews became more informative. However it is 
possible that other people joining the conversation have influenced the interview in a way 
that people did not tell the same things as they would have told if there was only me and 
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the interpreter. Yet I do not think that happened a lot because most of people were very 
open to talk to me. 
The method that I used for choosing participants to the interviews was random sample 
because there was no adequate demographic data of the people living in the barangays. 
Also, all the people were not available all times of the day so I decided to do interviews 
from house to house. The quietness of the interview location would have been ideal, 
however people were passing by or sometimes the respondents had to take care of children 
at the same time. There were also cases when I was having a discussion with shopkeepers 
and then the customers interrupted the interview. But surely I did not want to act as a 
hindrance for the business so I just let the interruptions happen and we continued the 
discussion afterwards. 
I tried to interview both sexes, people living in different kind of houses, people with 
different ages and spatially from the whole barangay area. The age breakdown is more 
precisely presented in Table 9. In order to ensure the spatial balance I collected GPS points 
for support. In addition I interviewed only one person from one household because some 
questions dealt with the situation of the whole household (e.g. income, livelihoods). Even 
if the questions were pointed for individuals the respondents would usually reply on behalf 
of the entire household. According to the Philippine Statistics Authority (2003) the 
household is defined as “an aggregate of persons, generally but not necessarily bound by 
ties of kinship, who live together under the same roof and eat together or share in common 
the household food”. Members consist of the head of the household, relatives that live with 
him/her and other persons that share the life for some consideration.   
Table 9. The age division of the semi-structured interview participants. 
Age Salvacion Sawa Ferreras 
18-30 0 1 1 
31-40 4 0 2 
41-50 0 6 5 
51-60 2 2 3 
61-70 2 2 1 
71+ 0 1 2 
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Particularly I was also looking for the most vulnerable people. The features that may 
increase the people’s vulnerability are not only the loss of assets and home but also lack of 
personal documents, lack of communication methods between family and friends, and 
sometimes lack of physical protection (NEDA 2013). The most vulnerable groups in the 
SPR, defined in a demographic way, are separated children, single-headed households with 
children, indigenous people, disabled people, the elderly, displaced people and traumatized 
people (HCT 2013). One of the demographic groups inside the group of vulnerable people 
that I specifically tried to reach was the elderly because they often have valuable 
knowledge of the community life on a longer term. I also got the opportunity to interview 
disabled people and single-headed households. 
I aimed at interviewing both men and women equally, but men were harder to reach 
because their job was often outside the house. The division between men and women in the 
semi-structured interviews can be seen in Table 10. Most of men were fishermen, farmers 
(coconut, rice, root crops, and vegetables), pedicab drivers or carpenters so they were not 
as much home during the daytime as women. Women’s occupations, such as shop keeping, 
washing or embroidery enables them to stay home more than men. Shops were usually in 
front of the houses where the families lived in. Women were also more responsible for 
housekeeping and taking care of the children. The average size of a household was 4.85. 
This sample includes the information from 34 individual interviews. However the sample 
is not sufficient for any statistical reliability and quantitative analysis is not the aim of this 
study either. This is only for background information.   
Table 10. The gender division of the semi-structured interview participants. 
Gender Salvacion Sawa Ferreras 
Male 3 2 6 
Female 6 10 7 
 
Most people were particularly willing to take part in the interviews and none of the 
approached people refused to be interviewed. The respondents always invited us to their 
homes or at least offered a chair to sit in the yard area outside their house or a temporary 
shelter. Most of the people wanted to talk a lot, although there were also some that gave 
very slim answers. As the subject was rather sensitive some respondents started crying 
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during the interviews. That was actually a bit difficult situation for me as well as for the 
interpreter because we did not always know how to react on that. However the respondents 
were not refusing to answer any of the questions.  
I found semi-structured interview very useful method for this topic because I was able to 
get answers to approximately same questions in every interview. The order of the questions 
varied sometimes because it felt more natural to ask some questions after others if people 
already started to talk about some themes that I was going to ask them later. The questions 
also varied a bit depending on the situation of the respondent. I was able to leave some 
questions without prompting. For instance in cases when people did not participate to any 
Cash-for-Work programmes, then there was no point to ask the following questions such as 
the salary and organizer of the CfWs. I added some questions about the preparedness and 
DRR to the interview form only after I had left the first barangay because I felt that it 
would be interesting and useful information. So those questions were only asked from 
people in the last two barangays (Sawa and Ferreras) because it was not possible to return 
to the first barangay anymore and find the same respondents.  
The semi-structured interview questions considered people’s experiences of the typhoon 
and the assistance they had received, livelihoods and income, housing, and social capital. 
DRR and people’s perceptions of the changes in the frequency and density of natural 
disasters were also part of the interview. The most difficult question to answer was 
people’s possibilities to participate or volunteer in the programs of humanitarian 
organizations. In addition, people were not always sure from which source humanitarian 
assistance actually came from. I recorded all the interviews so that I could transcribe them 
afterwards and confirmed people’s permission for the recording. The names of the 
respondents were not asked in order to keep the anonymity of the people. Also, I was the 
only one to listen to all the recordings and the tapes will not be handed over to anyone else. 
4.1.2 Group discussion 
In order to obtain information from respondents in forms of attitudes, feelings, experiences 
and reactions I conducted group discussions in each barangays. The amount of people in 
group discussions varied from 5 to 13 (Table 11). My aim was to have around 8 people in 
each group discussion however this did not happen. The group discussions were usually 
held in public spaces so it was not possible to deny people who wanted to participate from 
attending to discussions. In Sawa there were only five people in the group discussion 
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because no more people appeared to the place I held the group interview. Instead, people in 
the group changed during the discussion in Ferreras because most of men participants had 
to leave the discussion and go to work (they were working in a shelter construction 
program) and then new people came in. Because of that I tried to organize another group 
discussion however I did not manage to do that for practical reasons. I had mixed gender 
groups in Salvacion and Ferreras but in Sawa the group consisted of women only. In 
addition I wanted to have some heterogeneity in the groups by asking people of different 
ages to participate. Crang and Cook (2007) suggest that some heterogeneity is beneficial to 
the group discussion as the participants share some mutual experiences, which was the case 
in this study. The typhoon was a very much common experience for all the participants. 
 Table 11. The participants of the group discussions. 
Barangay Participants 
Salvacion 13 people (women and men) 
Sawa 5 women 
Ferreras 8 people (women and men) 
 
The person that facilitates the group discussion is known as a moderator (Crang & Cook 
2007:90-104). In the group discussions I held the role of moderator was sometimes a bit 
unclear. I was supposed to be the moderator however since I lacked the knowledge of 
Waray-Waray language I needed to have interpreter with me. Therefore he was sometimes 
acting more like a moderator because he was able to react to everything a lot faster. Also if 
there were a lot of people talking at the same time (which sometimes happened in the 
group of 13 people) it was him who chose who to listen to. Even if he tried to listen to 
everyone it was not possible if people were talking at the same time. Crang & Cook 
(2007:90-104) also suggest that if there are people that are not talking as much as others 
the moderator can try to direct some questions particularly for them. However this was a 
bit challenging since I had to moderate the discussion through the interpreter. Therefore 
people were actually listening to the interpreter more than me for obvious reasons.  
So it is clear that there are at least three issues that had an influence on the group 
dynamics. The first one was the number of people attending. I feel that 13 people was too 
many because the discussion started to be difficult to monitor.  When the group size was 
big some people started to talk to the person next to them and therefore I and the 
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interpreter could not hear what everyone was saying. Again, five people were too few 
because the discussion did not get a good start. Instead it felt like an interview where I had 
to ask the same question from everyone in turns. According to Crang & Cook (2007:90-
104) this is something that the moderator should never do, but since nobody really talked 
anything that was the only thing I could do. Crang and Cook (2007:90-104) also suggest 
that instead of asking the same question the moderator should try to get people to react 
what other participants are saying. That worked rather well in the larger groups but not in 
the small one.  
The other issue that affected on the group discussions was gender dynamics. There are pros 
and cons in having mixed gender groups and it should be considered what is appropriate 
for each topic and group. I had both mixed gender and same gender groups because I 
wanted to observe if that had some difference in the group dynamics. Crang and Cook 
(2007:90-104) describe that although having mixed group may end up in a situation where 
men speak consistently whereas women have only one-on-one chats, it can also offer a 
chance to analyse the gender relations that exist between men and women. According to 
my experience from the Philippines gender did not have such a big impact but the 
personality of a person mattered more. There would usually be people who were more 
dominant than others and therefore leading the discussion but it did not have to do with 
gender.  Usually even if I tried to point the question for everyone and especially for those 
people that did not say much the same people would always start and lead the discussion.  
The third issue influencing the group discussion was pre-existing dynamics. Most people 
suggest that the researcher should try to find participants that are not familiar to each other 
in advance (Crang & Cook 2007). However that was very hard to carry out in the studied 
research areas since the barangays were small in population and the residents had a close 
relationship with each other. At least I made sure that only one person from each household 
was participating to the discussion. After the group discussions I certainly realized that I 
would have needed more practice in moderating a group discussion. Yet it was not easy to 
organize test discussions since they had to be organized on the field with the interpreter 
and the time was limited.  
The advantage of group interview is that it is faster than individual interview because the 
researcher obtains responses from a group of people at the same time. Instead, the 
disadvantages are that the opinions of dominant people will be over-represented and the 
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received information is less in-depth and detailed. However in group discussion the 
researcher gets to observe how individual’s comments are responded by other people 
(Payne & Payne 2004:103-108). The group interviews that I held gave me some extra 
information as the conversation was able to flow freely. It is obvious that people say 
different things in a group and in private, but it is worth mentioning that it is one of the 
reasons to have both (group and individual) methods in this study. 
4.1.3. Key informant interview 
I made key informant interviews with 5 informants, 4 of them being staff members from 
different humanitarian/development/human rights organizations, and one was a barangay 
official. The key informants are introduced in Table 12. The key informant interview is an 
ethnographic research method that uses key informants as a source of expert information. 
Key informants are members of society that due to their personal skills or position in the 
society are able to provide more and deeper information about the society and things 
around them. The major advantage of the key informant technique is that it is possible to 
collect a lot of high quality data in a short period of time. The biggest disadvantage of key 
informant interview is that due to their position in the society the key informants may only 
provide information that is politically acceptable and the sensitive issues may not be 
discussed (Marshall 1996). 
 Table 12. The participants of the key informant interviews. 
Title Organization 
Field Coordinator NCCP ACT Alliance 
Livelihood Facilitator Handikap International 
Information Management Officer UNICEF 
Director of operations Philippine Red Cross 
Barangay counselor  
 
The aim of the key informant interviews was to deepen my understanding about the topic 
and to be able to view the topic from different approaches. I would have liked to interview 
more officials from the public sector however that was not possible due to challenges in 
reaching them. Consequently staff members from different humanitarian agencies were 
able to provide me some useful information, such as how do they consider vulnerability in 
the programs, how does cooperation with different organizations work and how do they 
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consider DRR. The names of the key informants are not mentioned in this study despite 
they introduced themselves on the recordings. However their occupation will be 
mentioned. The barangay name of the barangay counselor will not be mentioned in order to 
keep anonymity of that person.  
4.1.4. Participant observation 
Participant observation is the core of ethnographic research. It tries to understand people’s 
ways of living in their everyday life. Participant observation is not only representing the 
world but taking part in it (Crang 1997:360). As mentioned earlier, due to my short period 
of time in the field taking part to the society was not complete. However in participant 
observation researcher spends time or lives with the communities in order to better 
understand them (Laurier 2003). The method includes watching the activities of the culture 
and keeping notes with a notebook and a camera. According to Kearns (2010) there are 
many purposes for observation however the most important for social scientific research 
are “counting, complementing and contextualizing”. The purpose of counting is to gather 
numerical data by observing. Complementing refers to collecting additional information to 
structurally collected data to complement and provide descriptions for more formal 
methods, such as semi-structured interviews. The last one, contextual understanding aims 
at conducting understanding of something through experience, being part of the situation 
(Kearns 2010). 
Participant observation has its roots in social anthropology but it was adapted by human 
geographers that wanted to gain better understanding about the meanings of the place and 
social contexts. The researchers agree that participant observation is difficult to describe 
due to its un-systematical nature (Kearns 2010). The benefits of participant observations 
are that it is quite easy to do and it provides a ground-up approach to the topic. The 
weaknesses are that is does not provide answers to anything by ‘clicking a button’ and it 
does not provide good answers for questions that need to be tested by a hypothesis (Laurier 
2003). An important part of participant observation is writing field notes that help 
researcher to remember the details of the situation that he/she wants to analyse later 
(Laurier 2003). During the field work I kept field notes which have helped me to go back 
to the situations and analyse them. 
Part of the observation in this research was field observation including community walks. 
Community walks acted as a way of getting to know to the area and developing an 
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understanding of the barangays. I did community walks before starting the interviews. 
There was always at least one community member answering to my questions and 
sometimes I also asked questions from the people that we were passing by. During the 
community walks I was shown the relocation sites (if there were any), different land use, 
residential areas and the most important buildings (usually a church and a school and 
possibly a health center and a warehouse). In Sawa the barangay was divided in six zones 
so I was shown all of them. Usually I visited the boundaries of the barangays since all the 
barangays were in small geographical areas and thus easily walkable. I collected GPS-
points with a GPS device during these walks marking the most important places as well as 
the places I made interviews. This was made only for ensuring the spatial balance of the 
interviewed households but the collected GPS points will not have any further use. 
Geographic Information System (GIS) methods would possibly bring something extra for a 
similar thematic topic, for instance if the study would focus more on the changes in 
housing. Nonetheless that would be an interesting topic for another study.   
4.2. Data analysis 
 
The approach to analyse this data is more inductive than deductive. In inductive approach 
the theory is the outcome of the research and not the other way around as in deductive 
approach. The key concepts and themes do not derive from earlier literature as much as 
from the data itself, including policy papers and interviews. Choosing inductive approach 
for this study is natural because there is not that much scientific literature available about 
early recovery. The aim is to analyse post-disaster recovery from the perspective of crisis-
affected people and therefore inductive approach is valuable for this study. Induction 
means drawing inferences from the data. However Bryman (2012:18-43) admits that often 
inductive studies do not necessarily create new theories but insightful and empirical 
findings instead, which more or less is the case in this thesis too. Inductive approach is 
typically associated with qualitative research (Bryman 2012:18–43). 
The data consists of the transcriptions from interviews and group discussions, field notes 
and photographs, policy papers and GPS points. The first step after the field work was 
transcribing. I transcribed individual interviews and key informant interviews from word to 
word and group discussions as precisely as possible due to the characteristics of the group 
discussion. I also wrote up parts of the field notes and organized photos.  
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The analysis is primarily based on the material collected in semi-structured individual 
interviews and group discussions since they are the key data collecting methods in this 
study.  Another key data for this study is the policy papers. The policy papers, interviews 
and group discussions were analysed using qualitative data analysis, more specifically 
categorization and discourse analysis. Qualitative data analysis differs from quantitative in 
a way that it reflects to the understanding of the researcher, and the researcher is an active 
participant in making the interpretations (Schutt 2011:320–357). Therefore I will focus on 
meanings instead of frequencies which support the qualitative nature of this study.  
In order to be able to respond to the research questions I analysed the data from individual 
interviews and group discussions at first using categorization. The categories ended up 
following partly the themes of individual interviews however the categories were not 
predetermined but generated from the data itself. The aim of the categorization is to bring 
out themes that help understanding the research problem. Categorization helps identifying 
important concepts and examining the relationships between different concepts, and lets 
the researcher deduce why things happened (Hiltunen 2015). According to Dey (1993:100-
120) categorization is not only putting together answers or observations that are similar to 
each other, but instead categorization already includes a comparison between answers: 
other answers do not belong to the same category. Categorization is mainly about inclusion 
and exclusion. The categories in this study are: 
1. Livelihood and income  
2. Housing 
3. DRR and resilience 
4. Social capital and capacity building 
In a qualitative research it is common to provide some quotes from the data in order to 
prove the readers that the analysis is based on real data that guides the researcher to do her 
conclusions. However Saaranen-Kauppinen and Puusniekka (2006) suggest that researcher 
should always make a proper reasoning if the quote in question is needed and what is the 
function of the quote. That is why I only chose quotes that I thought would bring 
something extra for the results and support the findings.  
Before categorization I highlighted some key words from the data in order to come up with 
the categories. I did the categorization using Excel which simplified analyzing the 
relatively large amount of data. Some answers related to more than one category and 
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therefore I was able to use the same data in several contexts. Categorization facilitated me 
in comparing the answers in the same category between the three researched villages. After 
categorization I took off some quotes and categorized them. The purpose was not to use all 
of them in this study but to choose the most relevant to justify the interpretations.  
Besides the individual interviews and group discussions I gathered some additional data on 
the field, including field notes and key informant interviews. This data was exploited to 
support or challenge the analysis made on the basis of individual interviews and group 
discussions. I also transcribed the key informant interviews from word to word and wrote 
notes. 
4.2.1. Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis (DA) focuses on researching the language and its use (Saaranen-
Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006). According to Hepburn and Potter (2004:180-181) the 
definition of DA is not simple because there exists a variety of orientations and ways of 
doing discourse analysis. What makes it more difficult is that different disciplines have 
their own contexts for DA. Roughly it can be said, however, that discourse analysis studies 
the production of social realities in social processes (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 
2006). Dittmer (2010) argues that DA is an excellent tool for the research if the researcher 
is interested in the ways in which knowledge is formed and explained by society. 
According to Waitt (2010:217-240) and Dittmer (2010) discourse analysis has become one 
of the key methods in analyzing data in human geography. Waitt (2010:217-240) claims 
that researcher should not be separate, but instead a part of the discourse analysis. DA does 
not seek truth but it attempts to understand the geographical circumstances. In DA 
researcher has to keep in mind that all production of knowledge refers to power, and some 
ways of knowing are popular while the others are silenced. Waitt (2010:217-240) suggests 
the researcher ‘to think critically about the social production’ of the text, meaning 
becoming aware of its technology, the author of the texts and the prospective audience. It is 
suggested that the researcher should carefully consider the texts that her/she is analyzing: 
what is the relationship with the author and the audience and what are the social dynamics 
in the production of the text, as well as what is the meaning and role of power in each text. 
In conclusion Waitt (2010:217-240) admits that DA is a good tool in addressing and 
challenging unequal power relations.  
 57 
 
Waitt (2010:217-240) follows the Foucaldian discourse analysis which claims that the 
researcher should look at the texts with new fresh eyes in order to forget the 
preconceptions. I tended to do that in the analysis although I found it challenging at times 
because preconceptions and foreknowledge was sometimes trying to dominate my 
thinking. On the other hand, Foucault too admits that predetermined categories are 
impossible to ditch totally because all the knowledge is socially constructed (Waitt 
2010:217-240).  
4.3. Critique and challenges of the methods 
 
Research quality is an important component of the studies. The research quality can be 
affected by various issues. This study will be evaluated on the basis of the most common 
concepts which are validity and reliability as well as through the criteria for trustworthiness 
of qualitative research by Guba and Lincoln (1989).  The criteria consist of credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability.  
There are always issues concerning reliability and validity of the data when doing field 
research. When interviews are done with an interpreter in a different language, there is a 
possibility for misunderstandings, information forging and leaving something unnoticed. 
Even if you do not want to think so, some people may want to lie purposely, either the 
interpreter or the respondents. Furthermore cultural nuances and metaphors do not translate 
well and need to be explained one way or another (Merriam et al 2010). 
There are at least two issues that can decrease the reliability of the research when interview 
has been chosen for its method. The first is asking the right questions and second is the 
anonymity of the respondents, especially if the research question addresses private or 
sensitive issues. The anonymity is also needed in order that respondents can be honest in 
their stories without being afraid of the reactions of other people. If the researcher wants to 
use photos or videos that have some people in, he/she must ask for the participants’ 
permission while still in the field before publishing them. It may not be possible to ask 
these questions later after leaving the field (Scheyvens & Storey 2003). Therefore I made 
sure on the field that it is ok to publish the photos and assured the anonymity of the 
respondents by not publishing their names. 
Credibility means the extent to which the respondents’ constructions match to the findings 
presented by the researcher. Credibility increases if researcher explains the decisions made 
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during the data collection and analysis. Credibility is also enhanced by persistent 
observation as well as prolonged engagement however that was not possible for me in this 
study (Clissett 2008). As mentioned earlier it was not possible to spend more than three 
weeks in the field which made it impossible to create deep relationship with respondents to 
fully deserve their trust.   
Transferability means the degree to which the study findings can be generalized or used in 
other contexts. This may not be so easy in small qualitative studies – such as this study – 
because there are lots of issues that can have an influence to the findings. In order to 
increase the degree of transferability in this study I tried to describe the research context 
and the possible assumptions clearly and thoroughly. Dependability is defined by the 
extension to which the research would produce the same findings if it was remade in a 
similar context (Clissett 2008). However as this is a qualitative case study it is not possible 
to make the exact same research again. Consequently I was able to increase the degree of 
dependability by trying to describe the changes occurred in the settings of the study as well 
as justifying the decisions that were made. Thus the reader is able to follow and understand 
the research process. 
Confirmability refers to the degree to which the results could be confirmed by other 
researchers. In order to increase confirmability of the research the researcher needs to 
clarify the links between results and the collected data. If possible another researcher can 
also check the data and results in order to know if the results would then be the same. 
However it has been admitted that different researchers can produce different constructions 
with the same data (Clissett 2008). As this is a small scale study it is not possible to let 
other researchers check the primary data and the results but to increase confirmability I 
tried to use many direct quotations to justify the findings.  
One essential challenge for the research is cultural differences when research is done in 
“Third World”. There were some ethical issues that needed to be considered before 
entering the field. The first issue is power imbalances between researcher and participants 
partly because of the unequal division of wealth and power. Researcher needs to respect 
the culture, traditions and knowledge of the community and make respondents fully 
cognizant of the study they are participating. Research in Third World should not be done 
just because of “fun” and for the interest of the researcher, but instead to be able to 
politically empower those individuals and communities in need of help (Scheyvens & 
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Storey 2003). As I have mentioned earlier, there are advanced motives and aims for this 
study than just curiosity.  
The position of researcher needs to be acknowledged. Commonly it is admitted that a 
researcher may either be an insider or an outsider. Both roles have weaknesses and 
strengths, and in this case study my role as a researcher was an outsider. The advantage of 
being an outsider lies in the possibility to ask sensitive and taboo questions, the curiosity to 
dig into unfamiliar societies and being seen as impartial within the society’s subgroups. 
Alternatively being an outsider means that the researcher is not able to get authentic 
understanding about the culture or does not have as easy access to the research subject as 
an insider would have. The features that affect the position of a researcher are gender, 
social class, age, political affiliation, religion and the region. The division between insider 
and outsider is not a clear one though, and issues like education, class, race or even the 
duration of contacts may contribute to the position of the researcher (Merriam et al 2010). 
Thinking about myself as a researcher, being a young white woman could in some cases 
decrease my credibility, but Philippines is not the most patriarchal country in the world, so 
gender did not cause major problems. In addition it was beneficiary to me that I had a local 
interpreter, young man that made entering the field much easier and people were more 
receiving. 
5. RESULTS 
Below I will present the results from the empirical research. At the beginning I will provide 
an answer to the first research question about the impacts of the disaster. Then I move on to 
the second research question discussing the implementation of early recovery aspects in 
humanitarian response. The last part of the results focuses the disaster resilience of the 
communities. In human geography it is common that interpretation and presentation of the 
results are covered in the same chapter because in this kind of qualitative study it is 
difficult to present the results without any subjectivity (Bradford 2003:529). Therefore I 
will follow that approach in this chapter. This chapter will also reflect on theoretical 
framework. 
The results chapter will begin with the affected people’s experiences of the impacts of the 
crisis (5.1.) and continue to post-disaster early recovery (5.2.) divided in livelihoods and 
income recovery (5.2.1.), housing (5.2.2.), and disaster preparedness (5.2.3.). Lastly I will 
present the results to third research question about disaster resilience (5.3.) divided in 
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people’s own resilience systems (5.3.1.) and role of humanitarian aid in building the 
resilience and capacities of the local communities (5.3.2.). 
5.1. Disaster’s impact on people 
 
The first research question is about the disaster’s impact on people. The answer for this 
question will partly derive from secondary data as I have already presented the disaster 
impact on a more general level in chapter 3. However here I will focus on the results from 
the field from the perspective of crisis-affected people from three chosen barangays.  
When asking people what was their biggest need after the typhoon most of them replied 
food, shelter, water and clothes. All these are defined as the most basic needs by Gaillard 
and Cadag (2009). Medicines (for colds), kitchen utensils, kerosene to light fire and 
livelihood were all mentioned once. According to people the roads were not passable and it 
took days before the relief arrived. Until that people took advantage of everything they 
had. They were able to utilize natural resources by eating bananas that were fallen off and 
water they got from coconuts however that was only short term self-help. When the relief 
goods started to arrive people were able to eat regularly again. 
The material losses were broad including houses, fishing equipment, other livelihood 
equipment, livestock, harvests (including coconut trees), and basically all other assets. 
Most of the coconut trees were cut off during the typhoon and it takes about ten years to 
harvest new coconut trees. The fallen coconut trees were often utilized as lumber. 
All the houses suffered from damage but the level of damage varied. The houses made of 
light materials such as wood, coconut lumber and bamboo with roofs from nipa (dried 
coconut leaves) or galvanized iron sheets were often totally damaged (Fig. 8). The roofs 
made of galvanised iron sheets caused a lot of injuries because they were hurtling around 
during the storm. Also the houses right on the coast suffered from greater damage. Instead, 
houses made of concrete were in most cases just partially damaged (Fig 9.). It was 
common that the roof had come off or the walls were damaged. Nevertheless one of the 
respondents in Ferreras described for me that his entire house was totally damaged albeit it 
was made solely from concrete which to my experience was quite rare. I did not notice any 
significant difference in the level of damage of the houses between the barangays because 
it was common that houses were totally washed-out.  
 61 
 
The respondents were generally satisfied with the emergency help because they got their 
basic needs fulfilled for a while. However I think the help was not sustainable. A big 
problem was shelter, because people did not receive enough materials to rebuild their 
houses. In addition, a great need for livelihood support was notable. When I analysed the 
answers about the level of satisfaction towards the humanitarian response it has to be kept 
in mind that I was the person people were talking to. Therefore I cannot be sure if people 
were actually satisfied for the help, or if that was something they only told me since they 
thought I was connected to the donors due to my western look.   
Some respondents claimed that since they had more political power, better houses or higher 
pre-disaster income they did not receive as much assistance as others or they were not 
considered as beneficiaries of humanitarian programs. However, according to key 
informant interviews humanitarian aid aims to prioritize the most vulnerable people and 
therefore that was justifiable. Nevertheless, as I mentioned in theoretical framework the 
battle of donors’ money and the following changes in the power relations are proved to be 
a common phenomenon in the post-disaster situations. 
 
5.2. Early Recovery 
 
I collected the data about early recovery related issues in order to be able to assess how 
well early recovery had been implemented from the perspective of crisis-affected people. 
This chapter will be divided in three sub chapters handling livelihoods and income 
recovery, housing and disaster preparedness. As it was discussed in theoretical framework 
natural disasters do not affect everyone evenly, but they are discriminatory. Therefore some 
people will be more affected than others. In order to increase the effectiveness of aid 
Figure 9. Concrete house in Ferreras. Figure 8. Wooden house with nipa roof 
in Sawa.       
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humanitarian aid should be differentiated by the vulnerability of the crisis-affected people. 
The distribution of aid can vary greatly in relation to demographic groupings, livelihoods 
or other factors. I will compare the data collected in the field with the policy papers 
covering the directions for early recovery: Guidance note on early recovery and Early 
recovery, Livelihoods and Agriculture plan. Minor notice will be taken into The 
Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) and The Strategic Response Plan (SRP).   
5.2.1. Livelihoods and income recovery  
This chapter will provide an answer for the first sector of the research question about early 
recovery: livelihoods and income recovery. At the moment of the field work many 
respondents did not have a regular income but the income consisted of different livelihood 
options. The livelihoods mentioned were fishing, carpentry, store keeping, washing clothes, 
farming, driving a pedicab or habal-habal (riksa), livestock and viewing mats. Harvesting 
coconut trees and making coconut products (such as coconut wines, oils, vinegar, coconut 
leaves for roofing materials) was one of the most important sources of income in every 
three barangays. Some of the respondents also had livestock, most commonly chickens or 
pigs. Lots of livestock was lost during the typhoon but it came out that humanitarian 
agencies were doing livelihood projects and providing livestock for the crisis-affected 
people.  
 
Figure 10. Lots of fishing boats were lost during the typhoon.  
Many people were not able to carry out the previous occupation or source of income 
because mainly they did not have enough financial capital to start again or they had just 
been able to start recently. For instance some fishermen had not been able to start fishing 
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again because they were lacking materials. To start fishing you need a lot of capital to buy 
the boat (Fig. 10), nets and engine for the boat. 
Before the typhoon we actually had plantations of coconuts, which was our source of 
income. After the typhoon, since we don’t have the coconuts any more, my husband 
would usually go with somebody who has a fishing boat, for him to be able to fish 
since we actually don’t have our own fishing boat. (Female, 34, Ferreras) 
I noticed that there were some differences between the barangays in terms of livelihoods. 
Biggest difference was between Sawa and other two barangays because Sawa does not 
have a coast line so fishing was not practiced for obvious reasons. In Ferreras a lot of men 
were employed in a shelter project of ACT Alliance where the workers constructed new 
houses for people that had lost their homes. Lots of people were involved in the project as 
labour because the project used rotation and changed workers every week.  
Instead of only providing commodities the provision of cash or vouchers can be 
significantly beneficial for the recovery process. It gives people more choice, irrigates local 
markets and gives people the possibility to invest in their livelihoods and therefore make a 
better living and improve disaster resilience. There are different types of cash transfers, 
such as individual direct transfers, grants, providing cash for work or vouchers for goods 
(GHA 2014). None of the crisis-affected people that I talked to had received livelihood 
support or cash assistance from the government, but humanitarian agencies had provided 
some livelihood support and cash assistance in Salvacion and Ferreras. The variation in 
terms of cash assistance was notable between the barangays (Fig. 11).  
In Salvacion almost all respondents had received some livelihoods earmarked support from 
humanitarian agencies or co-operatives. In Salvacion crisis-affected people had also 
received boats and other fishing equipment or materials to build boats themselves. 
Providing and rebuilding fishing boats and equipment is suggested in both policy papers 
and that seemed to have been carried out. However some people still claimed that besides 
the boats not enough fishing equipment had been received. Compared to the other two 
barangays it seemed to me that there might have been an oversupply of fishing boats in 
Salvacion because many families had more than one boat. The respondents in Salvacion 
also received livelihood support for rebuilding stores and for having livestock, such as 
keeping pigs or laying eggs. The financial assistance in Salvacion mainly came from 
humanitarian agencies but credit co-operative OCCY was also mentioned as one of the 
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donors. In addition, people mentioned having received unconditional cash assistance from 
Christian Aid and Red Cross from 1500 to 5000 pesos. People had also received 200 pesos 
each from a philanthropist.  
 
Figure 11. The division of the recipients of cash assistance between the three study areas. 
The crisis-affected people had not received any livelihood support in Sawa although they 
were waiting for a livelihood program to start by ACT Alliance. In addition, none of the 
respondents in Sawa had received any cash assistance for any purpose. Nor they had heard 
anyone receiving anything in their barangay. Some of the respondents felt that other 
barangays had received more help, especially in terms of financial assistance, livelihoods 
support and CfW-programs. According to my experience from other barangays that was a 
correct assumption. It was also once mentioned for me that only the people that are close to 
barangay officials would benefit from help, and if you are not in good terms with the 
officials sometimes you would not be given any relief or assistance.  
In Ferreras people had received livelihood support from humanitarian agencies, mostly 
group livelihoods such as livestock. However they were not satisfied with it due to 
problems in co-operation. In Ferreras people had also received financial support for 
fishing, in terms of equipment or cash to purchase the equipment. Red Cross had provided 
10 000 pesos for fishermen that had lost their boats. One of the respondents also mentioned 
having received 10 000 pesos for livelihood purposes from Terres des Hommes. Most of 
the respondents in Ferreras had received unconditional cash transfers, 3200 from Red 
Cross and 700 from Caritas. In Ferreras it was mentioned that sometimes humanitarian 
agencies target the poorest of the poor in their livelihood programs, but then also others 
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that do not fill the criteria receive livelihood assistance. Therefore it seems clear to me that 
there must be other, most probably political, reasons affecting the distribution policy of 
livelihood assistance. In all three barangays group discussions supported the answers of 
individual interviews about cash assistance and livelihood support.   
Promoting small enterprise recovery with trainings and financial assistance is suggested in 
the Guidance note on Early Recovery. According to the respondents the lack of capital and 
equipment usually prevented self-employment trough small enterprises. Even if people had 
small enterprises before the disaster they were not always able to restore them. Either it did 
not seem to me like local traditional livelihood activities would have been diversified 
because most of the livelihood programs supported the old livelihoods to be restored.  
Both early recovery papers suggest establishing and supporting home or school gardens 
and establishing community based plant nurseries. None of the interviewees particularly 
mentioned home gardens however during the community walk I was shown a community 
plant nursery in Salvacion provided by ACT Alliance. Unfortunately it was not in use at the 
moment and I was not given a clear reply why it is so. Restoring damaged crops, providing 
seeds and farming equipment was suggested in the papers however none of the 
interviewees mentioned having received any seeds or fertilizers as livelihood support. 
However I did not particularly ask about farming equipment but livelihood support in 
general. So therefore it is possible that people have received something but forgot to 
mention.  
Providing livestock or poultry was planned in Early Recovery, Livelihoods and Agriculture 
Plan and that had been carried out at least to some level. People had received pigs or 
bought them with the conditional livelihoods cash transfers. Also the key informants told 
me that a lot of humanitarian agencies were doing livestock projects but problems with the 
suppliers acted as a hindrance for promoting them.  
Typhoon affected the incomes that were usually drastically dropped in the result of losses 
in livelihoods. The loss of coconut trees affected to the levels of income in all three 
barangays. Even if farming was not the primary source of income lots of people earned 
some extra income from coconuts. Also loosing assets, such as the products in the stores, 
and the whole store buildings as well as vehicles caused major drops in income levels. 
Fishermen explained the lower income levels also due to decreased amount of fish in the 
sea after the typhoon. Fishermen suspected that the living area of the fish was destroyed, 
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because before the mangroves helped to increase the amount of fish in the sea. The 
mangroves were not rehabilitated yet although that was planned in Early Recovery, 
Livelihoods and Agriculture Plan. There were also more fishermen now compared to the 
pre-typhoon situation because some other livelihoods had been lost. That made the daily 
catch very little for fishermen.  
There are actually times that we cannot catch any fish. If we can it’s only a kilo or 
just a few pieces. (Group discussion, Salvacion) 
Figure 12 illustrates the division in access to credit or lending money. It represents the 
responses from individual interviews however the group discussions more or less 
supported the division. Although quite some people had access to credit or lending they did 
not usually go for it because the interest rate was really high (up to 20 or 30%). In addition, 
it was mentioned that it is difficult to borrow money if the borrower does not have a 
regular income, which was the case among the most vulnerable people (elderly, disabled, 
single-headed households). People also mentioned being ashamed for borrowing if they 
would not have anything to pay back. Some people were able to borrow from neighbors or 
relatives however not much because everyone was in need. In Ferreras people mentioned 
receiving conditional cash transfers from the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4P’s) 
human development program of the national government. 4P’s program targets poor 
households with two objectives: providing short term poverty alleviation as well as 
breaking the cycle of poverty in a long term (DSWD 2015). Both in Sawa and in Ferreras 
one person mentioned for me that they are able to get credit from Center for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (CARD) Inc. that offers microfinance and other loans with a low 
interest rate (CARD Bank 2014).   
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Figure 12. The division of people that had access to credit or lending money. 
Cash-for-Work (CfW) programs were offered in all three barangays in order to implement 
emergency employment, which is also advised in Guidance note on Early Recovery and in 
RAY. Most of the programs lasted from 10 to 15 days and the average wage per day was 
around 260 pesos. The money was for free use and not earmarked for any specific purpose. 
Most of the programs were offered by international agencies but the Philippines 
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) also organized clean-up drives 
or clearing of the barangays. However the respondents in Salvacion complained that most 
of the CfWs were on construction and thus more directed at men. Women could usually 
participate in painting of the buildings but the respondents felt that there were only a few 
programs offered for women. In addition there were no programs for elderly in Salvacion.  
Senior citizens are asked to stay home. (Female, 61, Salvacion)  
According to the respondents there was only one CfW-program in Sawa and that was a 
clean-up drive organized by the DSWD. The people told me that not everyone was able to 
participate and the salary was only half of what it was supposed to be. However the 
residents of barangay Sawa shared the income with everyone, also with the people that 
were not able to join. 
In Ferreras there were several CfW-programs offered both by international agencies and 
DSWD, mainly clean-up drives, planting and construction. The elderly were also able to 
participate in the clean-up drives up to their capacity. Some programs were based on 
rotation in order that everyone would be given a possibility to participate. Also in Ferreras 
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people were still waiting for the other half of the salary from the CfW-program organized 
by the DSWD. For the sake of comparison, more than US$ 4 million was required in Early 
Recovery Plan for funding the debris removal CfWs, particularly maintaining work crew.   
In all three barangays people wished for more CfW-programs because lots of people had 
still not been able to restore their livelihoods. Also, community members saw the 
usefulness of the programs in supporting the livelihood restoration. Egg laying, 
rehabilitation of the seabed and mangrove forest and infrastructure development were 
mentioned among the additional CfW-programs that community members wished for.  
The Guidance note on Early Recovery mentions that cash grants or other social security 
should be provided for those who cannot work. However none of the elderly or disabled 
had received any additional help. There was also one single parent that had not received 
any help albeit she had her own family. She and her children were counted as the same 
family with her parents however the total assistance they received did not support them 
enough for their daily needs. The way in which elderly were noticed was that they received 
more medicines and they were prioritized in the distribution of relief goods. Also, almost 
all the aged people had got help in carrying the relief packages home, usually from 
volunteers or family. There was only one aged person in Sawa that did not get any help and 
therefore carried the bags one by one. All the key informants from international agencies 
confirmed that the priority is the poorest of the poor and the most vulnerable and therefore 
they are the primary targets of the projects. However, prioritizing vulnerable people only in 
relief distribution does not fully take to account vulnerability.  
5.2.2. Housing 
This chapter will focus on housing. It provides an answer to the second part of the research 
question about assessing post-disaster early recovery. At first I will provide some general 
information about the housing situation as the moment of the field work. 
Most of the respondents in every three barangays had their houses either totally washed-
out/damaged or partially damaged. However people were mainly living in the same areas 
as before the typhoon.  Few respondents had left to Manila or other bigger cities to stay 
with their relatives and get help. Transportation became very expensive right after the 
disaster and not everyone was able to move away temporarily even if they wanted to. To be 
able to get transportation was mainly depending on financial or political capital, meaning 
that people with a lot of money or high political status were able to get or buy 
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transportation. However most of the people had returned back to their pre-disaster homes 
in a time period of few weeks to few months and returned to the remains of their old homes 
or makeshift shelters since there were no other places to go. It is not common for Filipinos 
to have insurance for their houses or any other property. Some of the residents owned the 
land they were living in, but some were also renting the land. Sometimes the land was 
owned by relatives so the families did not have to pay rent for it.  
In Salvacion there was a shelter project by ACT Alliance going on that provided new 
houses for people whose houses were damaged. All the people that were living on the coast 
or inside the 40-metre no-build zone were waiting to be relocated in the relocation area that 
was located further from the coast on a higher ground. The Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources (DENR) of the Philippines declared a 40-metre no-build zone along 
the coastlines of Eastern Samar and Leyte, two of the worst-hit areas after Haiyan damaged 
the coastlines. However, at the moment the message of no-build zones is mixed since the 
government talks about changing no-build zones into no-dwelling zones because tourism-
oriented businesses and fishing industries still need to be built closer than 40 meters from 
the coast (GOVPH 2014). Nonetheless during my time on the field both the crisis-affected 
people as well as the key informants were talking about no-build zone.  
In Salvacion construction of the new houses was still on process and a lot people were still 
living in UNHCR donated emergency tents (Fig. 13) and other temporary makeshift 
shelters. Particularly households living on the coast were still living in temporary shelters, 
but those households were going to be relocated to the new relocation area further from 
their previous location. According to the ACT Alliance staff members there were problems 
with the land ownerships since government owns the land on the new relocation area and 
will not give the land for free. As of the moment ACT Alliance had received an agreement 
that people are allowed to stay there for 50 years for free. The needs-assessment had been 
made and the chosen households most often knew if they were to be relocated. Still none 
of the respondents knew when the construction would start or when they would be 
relocated.  
One of the interviewees as well as some of the people attending to the group discussion 
were living in new houses provided by ACT Alliance (Fig. 14) in Salvacion. Those houses 
were built around the same areas as their old pre-typhoon houses. People with new houses 
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were very satisfied for the houses because the houses were partly concrete. The location 
remained the same so the inhabitants did not have to adapt to new surroundings.  
 After the typhoon this house looked like a Big Ben. (Male, 57, Salvacion) 
     
Figure 13. People living in tents in Salvacion.     Figure 14. A concrete house provided by  
                                                                                   ACT Alliance shelter program. 
One has to keep in mind that the barangay Salvacion is located on a small island which 
restricts the means of transportation of the construction materials. There are only small 
bangkas (wooden boats) that operate between the island and the main land. Field 
coordinator from ACT Alliance also told me that there were problems with the suppliers of 
the construction materials which made the reconstruction process slow.  
People living in tents were not satisfied with the living conditions since the tents got really 
hot during the day time. People were also afraid that the tents would be blown off when it 
is raining and winds are strong. The major safety concern for all the people was weather. 
The weather was the biggest concern in living conditions in every three barangay (Fig. 15). 
People felt that temporary houses would not withstand new typhoons or storms. The people 
that had new houses provided by ACT Alliance felt safer now even in the case of a new 
typhoon. The houses are constructed to withstand strong winds and portion of the house is 
concrete, compared to their old houses that were made of light materials (wood, bamboo, 
dried coconut leaves).  
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Figure 15. Some respondents were not satisfied for their living conditions. The reasons why 
people were unsatisfied for the current living conditions are presented here. 
In Sawa most of the respondents were still rebuilding their old houses or building totally 
new houses. For the most part people were still living in temporary shelters or unfinished 
houses that were not sturdy enough for future storms. Many interviewees had received 
some construction materials mainly from Habitat or ACT Alliance or were waiting for 
materials from ACT Alliance to build a new house or to fix the old one. According to ACT 
Alliance there was again a problem with the suppliers and people had to wait for the 
materials for long periods of time. The most vulnerable people were the ones that had not 
been given assistance to rebuild their houses yet and they were still staying in makeshift 
houses which made them even more vulnerable in case of another wave of disaster. 
The major safety concern in Sawa was weather, but also personal security. The houses 
were made of light materials and they were still lacking doors and even walls so anybody 
could come in when the residents were sleeping. One family living in a house made of 
galvanized iron sheets did not feel comfortable because of the heat of the house. The 
elderly were particularly concerned about the safety of their house since they would be in a 
group of the most vulnerable if there was a new typhoon. As Sawa is not located on the 
coast there was no specific relocation area, but the new houses were built mainly on the 
same places as they used to be before. However the materials of the new houses were more 
resistant.  
Ferreras had the same 40-metre no-build zone policy as Salvacion however a lot of people 
still lived within that zone because the main livelihood is fishing. The plan by ACT 
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Alliance is to relocate all the people from no-build zone further from the barangay area to 
the relocation site, but this had not been started yet. There was a shelter construction 
project by ACT Alliance in Ferreras which was focusing on constructing the houses that 
are located in the existing barangay area. People had also received some materials from 
humanitarian agencies (mainly Terres des Hommes) in order to build temporary shelters or 
rebuild the damaged ones.  
The people in Ferreras felt comparatively safe in their houses by the time of my fieldwork. 
One interviewee mentioned that she is feeling safer now because she lives further from the 
shore on a family-owned plantation land. Some respondents told that they feel safe 
however they still live by the coast but they have better construction materials (plywood, 
galvanized iron) for their houses. One respondent was not feeling safe at all and she felt 
that she would only feel safe after she and her family will be relocated. Most of the 
respondents would still be afraid of the new typhoons and they wished that they could 
evacuate to better places next time. Some people had beliefs that a strong typhoon like 
Yolanda would not hit the same place twice, or at least not very soon. However there is no 
scientific evidence for that.  
I feel safe even after Yolanda, since if there would be another it would not be as 
strong as Yolanda and if there was another it would still be a couple of years still. 
(Male, 81, Ferreras) 
The residents that were going to be relocated seemed relatively satisfied to move to the 
relocation area on the mountains however it was further from the shore.  
It would be ok to be relocated.  It would actually be a form of exercise to walk from 
the mountains down to the sea (Female, Ferreras). 
Some fishermen would rather stay closer to the shore, but they were not totally against the 
idea of moving further. One respondent claimed that he wants to live on the coast no matter 
what because he was so used to it and it was closer to his livelihood.  
In conclusion, Figure 16 shows how many people were satisfied to their living conditions 
in each barangay. It was mostly so that people living in newly built sturdy houses were 
satisfied and the others still in temporary shelters and houses not fully repaired were not. 
Especially the group discussions made it clear that there was a clear distinction in the level 
of contentment between people that had received new houses and people that had not. 
 73 
 
Some of the people were not actually fully satisfied even if they said so since a lot of times 
people later admitted that they are forced to be satisfied because at least they have a place 
to stay in.  
 
Figure 16. The division of people that were satisfied with their current living conditions. 
The way in which people were able to participate in the shelter projects was that they were 
given materials and directions to build the houses themselves. Guidance note on Early 
Recovery suggests that early recovery should build the capacity of the local communities 
in building shelter, but the participation of local people in the barangays was mainly 
perceived by involving men in the construction process. The participation and capacity 
building did not happen in its full extent. None of the interviewees mentioned having been 
part of the project management or decision-making.   
Guidance note on Early Recovery also suggests training local carpenters in building 
disaster resistant building technologies and supporting the kind of housing that integrates 
DRR. The houses in the shelter program were built by the community members so 
therefore they were trained in building the houses with more resistant techniques. The 
materials used were more sustainable and sturdy than the light materials used in housing 
before thus reducing the disaster risk.  
One of the recommendations in Guidance note on Early Recovery was to support the kind 
of housing that integrates gender, vulnerability and tolerance. According to ACT Alliance 
vulnerability was taken to account in the shelter programs by categorizing the houses in 
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totally damaged and partially damaged houses. Furthermore the category of totally 
damaged houses was divided by income categories and the lowest category, households 
that earned 10 000 pesos or less per month, were considered as the primary beneficiaries. 
However according to the answers of the participants I cannot say much about the policy in 
practice since the houses were not ready and many people were still living in temporary 
shelters. Some participants were also not sure if they were listed as beneficiaries or not and 
thus if they would be relocated. The situation was the same with gender, although I came 
across one situation where female-headed household was not listed as a beneficiary for the 
housing project because the household was categorized as the same household with the 
parents of the household head. However the head of the household had her own family and 
therefore should be categorized as a beneficiary on her own.  
5.2.3. Disaster preparedness and DRR in early recovery 
Integrating disaster risk reduction and restoring the capacity to recover from disaster 
belong to the aims of post-disaster early recovery in humanitarian programs. 
Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) also mentions improving disaster 
preparedness as one of its goals. This chapter will give answer to the third sub question 
about disaster preparedness in post-disaster early recovery.  
There was no adequate evacuation center in Salvacion, but during the typhoon people 
evacuated to the higher mountain areas where a new housing relocation site would also be 
built. A year after the devastating typhoon people did not have a clear picture of where to 
evacuate in case of a new disaster but most of them would only search for higher places. 
Some of the respondents mentioned that they had heard about plans to construct a new 
evacuation site to the mountain area by ACT Alliance. That information was confirmed by 
the ACT Alliance field coordinator although the construction had not started yet because 
according to him the strategic location for the evacuation site needed to be decided first.  
Barangay Sawa did not have an evacuation center either, and during Yolanda people stayed 
in two-storied houses, school buildings or church. Some of the residents in Sawa also went 
for their relatives in further barangays. For the elderly the church (as it is located in Basay 
proper) is bit a too far so in cases typhoon would come and there would not be enough time 
they would have to stay home and “hold on to anything they could hold on to”. The 
residents in Sawa in general had not heard of any plans as to where they can evacuate so it 
was up to them as to where they would be going if there was a new typhoon. 
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Ferreras was lacking an evacuation center as well and the place where people could 
evacuate was the mountain where the relocation area would also be built. Another possible 
evacuation site that was mentioned was a health center in the barangay however it is just a 
tiny building and therefore not spacious enough for everybody. Some of the respondents 
had also heard of an evacuation site that would be developed to the mountain area in the 
future. It was clear that the residents of all three barangays did not have a decent 
understanding of the evacuation plans and they had not been taught on where to evacuate 
in case of a new typhoon.  
I think that it would be better if somebody would build an evacuation center in the 
mountain so people would know where to go (Male, 61, Ferreras). 
Because of the country’s tendency to experience natural disasters it has developed early 
warning systems over the years. Strengthening the early warning system is an important 
part of post-disaster early recovery and disaster preparedness. The Guidance note on Early 
Recovery suggests strengthening community-based early warning systems. Early warning 
system is not only a warning system but besides the warning technique it includes more 
functions. There are four functions that make the early warning system effective, which are 
risk knowledge, monitoring and warning, dissemination and communication and response 
capability (UNISDR s.a.).  
The warning systems in these three barangays differed a bit but usually people received 
warnings either from television and radio or barangay or municipality officials that would 
go around the areas to warn people. In Ferreras there was a siren that would scream when 
people needed to evacuate. Ringing the church bell was used to warn people in Salvacion. 
All the respondents in every three barangays answered that they had been warned about the 
typhoon Haiyan and they knew that it was coming. Nonetheless they were not prepared 
and they did not have a sufficient understanding of the volume and the intensity of the 
typhoon. Consequently the communication and information provided was not clear enough 
and people did not understand what all the terms meant, such as storm surge. Storm surge 
means a change in the sea level and it is caused by a storm. High winds push the sea water 
towards the shore and it easily causes flooding. Storm surges are particularly dangerous for 
people living in coastal areas and they are often the cause of the casualties in tropical 
storms (Met Office 2014).  
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The response capability of the residents in Salvacion, Sawa and Ferreras was also 
inadequate since many of them were not ready to react to warnings. The evacuation should 
have been done earlier and people should have been better prepared as to know where and 
when to evacuate and what to pack with them. Most of the people felt that they were now, 
after Haiyan, more alert if another typhoon would approach the region. Nonetheless they 
were not necessarily better prepared mainly because lots of people were still living in 
temporary shelters that would not withstand new typhoons. However it felt like there had 
been a change in the attitudes of people and they were mentally more prepared to evacuate 
if ever there was a warning of a strong typhoon. Some people had also their clothes, basic 
accessories and some emergency stuff such as food items ready packed. Yet there was a 
really poor family that I met and the husband told that it would not be possible to evacuate 
immediately even in the case of a new typhoon warning since they would have to continue 
with their usual things in order to have even a little bit of money to be able to buy food. 
The very poor housing with a bad location and lack of income made them socially as well 
as physically vulnerable for disasters and lessened their capacity to tolerate the disasters.  
The guidance note on early recovery emphasizes increasing community awareness of 
existing hazards and strengthening local level emergency response mechanisms in the 
affected areas.  Risk knowledge is also mentioned as one of the four elements of effective 
early warning systems. Therefore I wanted to inquire if there had been any trainings or 
discussions in the barangay on how to prepare to natural hazards and in which ways the 
local residents are advised to prepare. In Sawa most of the respondents had not heard of 
any trainings, except some that had participated in the development session by 4Ps 
program or a discussion with CARD cooperative. The 4Ps session contained talks about 
climate change and discussion about the response capability. The discussion by CARD also 
handled the same themes.  
In Ferreras respondents had different information about trainings. Some people had not 
heard of any trainings, some had but could not remember the organiser, some had heard but 
were not on the list of people who can participate, and some people remembered that there 
were trainings organised by the municipality. Also a development and humanitarian 
organization Food for the Hungry had organised training in Ferreras months before the 
typhoon. One respondent told that there had been assemblies in the barangay on what to do 
and where to go in case a new typhoon would be approaching the region.  
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The question about risk knowledge and trainings was not asked from all the respondents 
since I just realized the importance of it when I had transferred to the second barangay and 
it was not possible to go back and find the same respondents in Salvacion again. So this 
data about risk knowledge and trainings only covers the latter two barangays, Sawa and 
Ferreras. However it seems like there were more trainings with more variety in Ferreras 
compared to Sawa. It is also interesting to notice that most of these trainings were 
organised by public sector since the 4Ps programs is a government program. International 
agencies were mainly covering all the other sectors but they had not started the disaster 
preparedness trainings, at least not in these two barangays.  
Although DRR related programs were not very noticeable in the studied barangays the key 
informants from the humanitarian agencies confirmed that it is just about the time when the 
NGOs and agencies are doing their DRR assessments and planning the orientations and 
trainings. However I was told in the key informant interviews that all the organizations are 
doing separate orientations and DRR plans that are not standardized. One of the key 
informants claimed that it will be a “massive disaster” if the DRR programs will not 
become standardized and there will not be any cooperation between the organizations.  
5.3. Disaster resilience  
 
This chapter seeks to find an answer to the third research question about the resilience 
systems of the crisis-affected people. It derives partly from people’s own resilience systems 
that refer to social capital and partly from the contributions of humanitarian aid. Although 
humanitarian aid has a significant role in people’s recovery from disasters, people’s own 
resilience systems should not be forgotten. As this study is made from the perspective of 
the crisis-affected people I want to highlight the potential of the communities. I presented a 
figure about community resilience in theoretical framework that highlighted four main 
factors contributing to community resilience, which are economic development, 
information and communication, community competence and social capital. The first two 
are more or less covered in the previous chapter about post-disaster early recovery, but the 
last two will be covered in this chapter. Especially social capital will be in focus. 
In the next chapter I will present what are they ways in which individuals and communities 
increase their own preparedness and utilize their own response systems. In the following 
chapter I will provide an answer to what are the ways in which humanitarian aid has 
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supported the communities to create an enabling environment for building disaster 
resilience. 
5.3.1. Communities’ own resilience systems 
This chapter will answer the question: What is the role of individuals’ and communities 
own resilience systems in disaster recovery? I will focus on social capital including social 
networks and good relationships. As it was discussed earlier in theoretical framework, 
people need capital to be able to meet their basic needs in life. Meeting the basic needs 
becomes more difficult in a situation of a crisis and therefore the need for capital increases. 
There are six types of capital that affect people’s capacity and one of them is social capital 
that includes social networks, participating to organizations and associations as well as 
good relationships (Gaillard & Cadag 2009). Adler and Kwon (2002) note, that social 
capital is more like an “umbrella concept” and therefore does not have one single 
definition. According to them the core idea of social capital is the “goodwill” that is seen 
as a valuable resource. Goodwill in this context refers to trust, sympathy and forgiveness 
that are given us by friends and other people we know (Adler & Kwon 2002). Woolcock & 
Narayan (2000) explain social capital as referring to the crisis situations when it is the 
friends and family that finally constitute the safety net. According to Moser (1996) the 
communities that have good social networks and associations will be in a better position to 
fight poverty and vulnerability. Social capital is a very central theme in the theory of 
community resilience (Norris et al. 2007). 
In all three barangays people mostly indicated having good relationships with all the other 
people in their barangay. A couple of people mentioned that there would only be small 
misunderstandings or disagreements but quite rarely. One of the respondents in Sawa noted 
that if ever there are problems it is usually due to someone being drunk. However people 
were generally close to each other and they were helping each other a lot. 
Many people had received some help, either cash or in-kind from their relatives or friends 
(Fig. 17). If it was cash, it was usually provided by children that were working in bigger 
cities, like Manila or Tacloban. People prioritized relatives before friends when giving help 
and particularly cash. More precise division of sources of help is presented in Figure 18. 
Only one respondent affirmed that he had received financial assistance from a friend 
(living abroad), 5000 pesos. As mentioned earlier it is common in the Philippines that 
people have relatives living abroad and they send remittances back to their families. In this 
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case also domestic remittances had a big role. In other words, social capital can be 
extremely important in case of a crisis and it was noticed that social capital was very much 
needed just after a disaster. Notwithstanding a lot of people also admitted that they had not 
received any help from friends or relatives. 
 
Figure 17. The division of people that received any kind of help (cash, in-kind or services) 
from social networks. 
 
Figure 18.  The sources of help received through social networks. The graph combines the 
data from all three study areas. 
It was common that the elderly did not have much of their own income since it was 
obviously hard to have any livelihood any more. Even if they were having some income 
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before the typhoon they had lost it by now. There was an old man who used to earn some 
income from coconuts but now when the coconuts were gone there was no income left. 
Also if there were any livelihood support available the elderly would not be prioritized 
because of their high age. The government support for senior citizens is very low. 
Therefore it was common that the elderly received money or other help from their children 
or other relatives who were working, either in the same barangay or sometimes further in 
the bigger cities. The elderly became particularly vulnerable after the crisis since they are 
in most cases only relying on their children in terms of income.  
Despite the fact that after the crisis everybody was in need, people were still willing to help 
each other in small ways such as sharing food or other necessities. In Philippines this kind 
of spirit of sharing and cooperation is called bayanihan. 
So we were able to help others if we had a lot of fish caught so we would share it 
with the neighbours. Like a support system with each other (Female, 37, Salvacion). 
It was not rare that if only some people received financial assistance from humanitarian 
agencies due to criteria, people would collect the money together and then divide it to all 
the people equally. Albeit this kind of behavior represents pre-eminently the baiyanihan 
spirit it does not necessarily promote an equal recovery process. As it has been discussed in 
theoretical framework humanitarian aid needs to be more differentiated by vulnerability in 
order to increase the effectiveness of the recovery process, which means that different 
people need different kind and different volume of aid. However, humanitarian agencies 
cannot really affect what happens with the money if the cash assistance is unconditional. 
The conditional cash transfers for specific purposes are easier to monitor but on the other 
hand, giving people the possibility to choose what to use the money for increases their 
independence.   
It was noticed that people were mainly providing positive answers when it came to the 
relationships with other people in the barangay. However it can be possible that people did 
not want to tell about any negative aspects, except the case from Ferreras about group 
livelihoods program. The group discussion in Ferreras revealed that people were not happy 
with the group livelihoods programs and therefore not willing to cooperate between other 
households. The reason for a negative attitude towards group livelihoods was that people 
did not trust that others would do their share in the work.  
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Most of the people in all three barangays were members of the government’s 4Ps program. 
Some respondents were members of cooperatives that allowed them to lend money with a 
low interest. In Ferreras there was also an organization, called night watch that did not 
occur in the other two barangays. The idea of the night watch is to take turns in keeping 
watch at night to avoid problems.  
The inequalities between people in terms of social capital were proven by their own 
stories. When asked if people received any help from anyone some people had received 
quite a lot, usually from the relatives, and some people had received nothing. It was 
mentioned by some that their relatives from further barangays came to help them. Also the 
quantity and type of help from friends and relatives varied a lot since some people received 
only some small in-kinds such as food and clothes whereas others something more 
valuable, such as livestock or financial assistance. Help to build the house was also 
mentioned as a form in which help from friends and relatives was received.  
The sense of community was visible in all three barangays. People ensured that there are 
no separate areas in the barangays where different groups of people live but instead 
everyone is able to choose wherever they want to live. People seemed to trust each other 
and the possible concerns usually fastened to people outside the community. For example, 
one of the participants in Sawa told me that in the aftermath of the typhoon there was a 
group of strangers in the barangay and there was a rumour that they might be prisoners that 
got out of the facility after the typhoon. That rumour was a shared concern for the whole 
community. That kind of experiences strengthened the sense of community because the 
community becomes one unit that is against a group of strangers. The disaster strengthened 
the sense of community also because people had to share what they had. However at times 
partially unequal aid distribution disrupted the sense of community.  
Place attachment was high among the residents in the barangays. Almost everyone was 
from the barangay where they lived at the moment, and only a couple of people that I met 
had moved from further, mostly because of marriage. Also the young people that I 
interviewed were not willing to move away from the barangay they lived. Even if they 
studied somewhere else they wanted to move back when they graduate. Displaced people 
had returned back to their old homes, even if nothing was left. People felt safe and satisfied 
if they were provided a house around the same area they used to live before. 
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5.3.2. The role of humanitarian aid in building disaster resilience 
As discussed in theoretical framework capacity building and increasing resilience of local 
communities are advisable ways in which humanitarian organizations can start to make the 
assistance more sustainable (Tamminga 2011; Kopinak 2013). Capacity building aims at 
increasing social capital of individuals and communities as well as capacitating vulnerable 
people to cope with disasters (Allen 2006). Local capacity building decreases the 
dependence of outside assistance and empowers communities to recover from disasters 
faster. This section aims to answer to the second part of third research question: What are 
the ways in which humanitarian aid has been able to support affected communities to 
create an enabling environment for building disaster resilience? The focus in this question 
is in the ways in which humanitarian aid can promote participation, capacity building and 
increase social capital among the communities and individuals.  
Participating to organizations and associations is part of social capital. There were some 
people in every barangay that were members of some kind of organization or association. 
Most of the associations focused on livelihoods, such as farmers, poultry or fishermen 
association and cooperative for fisher folks. All the organizations that focused on 
livelihoods were organized by humanitarian agencies or NGOs. Some women were 
members of women’s associations and one person mentioned being a member of a 
teachers’ association. One female mentioned that is difficult for her to join because there 
would be monthly contributions which would be difficult for her to contribute. The elderly 
were members of senior citizens’ association which is a national association for all senior 
citizens. All the members in senior citizens’ association should be eligible for a monthly 
pension but one of the members informed that it is not on a regular basis and sometimes it 
would take two months for them to receive any money. Therefore the elderly have to rely 
on their families.  
Participation of crisis-affected people to humanitarian response varied a bit depending on 
the person. The most common ways to participate were packing, carrying and distributing 
the relief goods. It was once mentioned for me in an interview that a person participated 
voluntarily in a feeding program for children by cooking food. One person mentioned 
having a responsible task in the barangay, since she was a barangay health worker and as 
such assisting people in need.   
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Apart from participating in the CfW-programs construction of the houses and carrying the 
construction materials were the most common ways to participate. Construction programs 
were open for both sexes according to ACT Alliance staff and the crisis-affected people 
however I did not meet a single female that would have participated in construction. The 
field coordinator from ACT Alliance explained that it is due to the fact that they need to 
have skilled workers for construction but there are no skilled female workers in the 
communities therefore they cannot participate.  
Field coordinator from ACT Alliance stated that building the capacity of the communities 
to stand on their own feet is part of their strategy. The ways in which I noticed local 
capacity building was by using local labour, mobilizing people and providing technical 
information in the shelter construction projects. The local people were mobilized as 
warehouse workers and community workers that seemed to be important positions for 
them. However not everyone was able or did not want to participate.  
I also wanted to know how well humanitarian agencies take into account the opinions of 
the crisis-affected people and therefore asked about the existence of possible systems for 
complaints. Offering redress (possibility to complain and responding to it) is also one the 
principles in Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP). All the staff members from 
the humanitarian agencies that I discussed with told that they were using some kind of 
complaint or feedback system. Most commonly it was a drop box where people can 
express their complaints or suggestions. Also contacting the agencies directly, via email or 
phone or walking to the office, was mentioned as one the ways in which people can 
express their feedback. Usually the barangay officials would also be part of the process, 
either as intermediaries or the ones who receive the feedback.  
ACT Alliance emphasized a way in which people can call, email or text directly to the 
secretary at the national level. According to ACT Alliance field coordinator they would 
also have a grievance committee at the barangay level where there are members from the 
agency, one barangay official and two beneficiaries. The purpose of the committees is to 
settle misunderstandings and other problems. All the agencies confirmed that they always 
respond to the concerns and try to resolve them. In big humanitarian organizations the 
feedback goes through a lot of people and therefore resolving takes time and systems are 
fairly bureaucratic. 
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On the other hand, the crisis-affected people in all three barangays were not very well 
aware of the complaining systems or did not think they were functional. In Salvacion the 
respondents had not heard of any complaints systems or then they thought that it is 
unnecessary to let out their grievances for the NGOs since there is a set of criteria that the 
agencies are strictly following. In Sawa most of the respondents thought that there is no 
such thing as complaint system. One of the respondents told me that they could talk to the 
local staff of NGOs and one of them told that they could approach the barangay captain.  
Seven respondents in Ferreras answered that in case of any complaints they would 
approach their barangay officials or barangay captain. However they were not satisfied 
with the response since they thought there is not much effort being done to provide an 
answer to their suggestions or complaints. A few respondents told that they could also 
approach the NGOs in case of complaints or suggestions however the response that they 
got was that they are only signed up to be here and therefore they would need to speak to 
the heads of the NGOs that are not visible in the area. Thus their grievances are just 
forgotten. Four people mentioned that they have chosen not to air out their concerns or 
complaints so therefore they did not know about any complaint systems.  
 “I didn’t try to air out any concerns because if I would be given assistance I would 
 receive it, if not, then be it.” (Male, 81, Ferreras) 
None of the respondents mentioned drop boxes for complaints. It can easily be seen that 
the systems for complaints need to be developed more. People were not aware of the 
systems and the systems mentioned did not seem to be very functional. Sometimes the 
systems were too bureaucratic and there were too many intermediaries before the 
complaint reached the right person. Additionally, people did not feel that responding to 
feedback was very functional and they were often left without responses. The response 
systems should be improved since the people that had left feedback felt that nothing is 
being done. In spite of the fact that ACT Alliance particularly emphasized that people can 
directly contact the national level, people were not familiar with the system. Also they 
might have other reasons for not contacting the national level directly, such as they do not 
feel like they have the right to complain.  
In theoretical framework I presented the critical thought from Korf (2007) towards the idea 
of gift giving in humanitarian aid. Korf thinks that instead of giving gifts from generosity, 
the gifts have some hidden expectations of getting something in return. The donors want to 
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see the recipients to express gratefulness. Furthermore Korf argues that this forced 
gratefulness produces humiliating situation for the recipient. As I listened to people some 
of them claimed that for some reason they do not want to, or they do not dare to complain. 
One quote from a recipient illustrates this idea of the forced gratefulness very clearly: 
“I feel that I do not have any right to complain because we got help anyway.” 
(Female, 67, Sawa)  
6. METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSION 
As I used discourse analysis as a method to analyse the data it was important to keep in 
mind who is the presumptive audience for the policy papers as well as for the interview 
transcriptions. It is suggested that researcher should carefully consider the texts that 
her/she is analyzing and specify the relationship with the author and the audience. The 
policy papers employed in this study were targeted for different audiences. The documents 
by Philippines Humanitarian Country Team (Early recovery plan, RAY and SPR) are 
mainly targeted for donors whereas the Guidance note on Early Recovery is targeted for 
humanitarian actors. In this study I compared the papers particularly with the viewpoints of 
the local people therefore all the guidance could not be included. The international 
standards for humanitarian aid are targeted for all the humanitarian actors and therefore 
provided me useful information of what to take to account in humanitarian response. 
Although I made clear that I was not working for NCCP ACT Alliance, but only doing a 
research I assume that some of the interviewees might still have narrowed down of what 
they told me. Also because it was not possible to create trustful relationships with the 
crisis-affected people they may have kept some things to themselves. The audience for the 
people in the interviews was me and the interpreter; however they knew that I would use 
their stories in this study and furthermore assign the results for ACT Alliance. Additionally, 
the interviewees considered the status of me and my interpreter higher since I was a 
westerner and my interpreter was educated too which might have had affected to their 
behavior and thus the results of this study. Yet I did not have much of a choice when it 
comes to the interpreter and I was just very happy to find one. Besides I was very satisfied 
with the interpreter and his skills.  
There were also other methodological issues that might have had affected the results of this 
study. Since I was not able to conduct interviews and group discussion in the local 
language it is for sure that some information has been left unnoticed. That was particularly 
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the case in the group discussions where a lot of people were talking at the same time. Also 
as I used random sample for choosing the participants, gender and age distribution was not 
uniform which may have had an impact on the results. In addition, the amount of 
interviews in each barangay was not very high, but on the other hand I felt like the 
saturation point was achieved for this thesis as a qualitative study. 
As referred to this study being semi-ethnographic the time spent on the field was rather 
short. It has both benefits and disadvantages for the study. The benefit of the short time 
period is that the objectivity was remained since I remained totally as an outsider. However 
it is possible that something essential has been left without notice since there was a lot to 
observe and understand. Luckily I was able to make the most of the time there since I 
started collecting data immediately and made a lot of interviews (1 to 8) and other data 
gathering per day.  
In addition it has to be kept in mind that the data gathered did not provide all-embracing 
results of the situation. I tried to provide an answer for the research questions but that is 
only a small part of post-disaster humanitarian aid in the case of Haiyan. And when it 
comes to the interview questions, after returning back home from the field and starting the 
analysis I realized that I had not asked all the requisite questions. However due to lack of 
resources and time it was not possible to return to the field and I had to settle for the data 
that I had.  
Two other limitations for this study are rapidly changing context and time. Rapidly 
changing context sets limitations in a way that the post-disaster reconstruction situation 
changes quickly. It means that the situation changed during the time I analysed the results 
and wrote this thesis. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter aims to provide the conclusions of the study by reflecting to the research 
questions posed in the beginning of the thesis. In this chapter I will present the implications 
of the findings and some recommendations that will hopefully be useful in developing the 
disaster response in the research areas in Samar. 
7.1. Early Recovery  
 
It is clear that even a year after the disaster some people were not able to fulfil their basic 
needs. Some participants which were interviewed in this study were lacking proper 
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housing and they still lived in temporary shelters. Some people had problems with 
providing food for their families, especially the ones that had not been able to fully restore 
their livelihoods. Shelter and food are the most basic needs and before fulfilling those basic 
needs it is difficult to focus on other activities, such as social activities and restoring 
livelihoods. It was well noticed that the people who were working in vulnerable 
employment or belonged to a vulnerable group (elderly, single-headed households, low-
income families etc.) were struggling even more after the disaster, compared to the pre-
disaster situation. Also the factors contributing to physical vulnerability, such as poor 
housing were visible. The lack of proper shelter and lack of income seemed to be the major 
problems among the participants.  
At the time I was on the field the livelihood restoration was still on process because many 
participants had not been able to return to their previous occupations. The previous 
livelihoods had not been sustainable because people were not able to recover their 
livelihoods from stress and shock caused by the disaster. The income levels were dropped 
and not a lot of alternatives were offered for the previous livelihoods albeit such 
livelihoods as coconut farming were not productive anymore. Some people were farming 
something else instead of coconuts, such as root crops; however the profit was not 
comparable to coconut farming. In order to build sustainable economic structure it is 
crucial that local communities can sustain the economy even when the aid stops. 
Livelihood restoration and restoring the local businesses are central in building sustainable 
economic structure in communities.  
It should be noted by the humanitarian livelihoods programs that in spite of the fact that 
Salvacion and Ferreras are mainly fishing communities, not everyone is a fisherman and 
therefore other livelihood support should be offered too. There is still room for 
improvements especially in livelihoods and income recovery. Returning back to the old 
means of income is not sustainable if the means of income continue to be vulnerable and 
therefore disaster risk reduction should be included in livelihood restoration. It is 
noteworthy that Sawa was lacking all livelihood support and the livelihood programs had 
not yet started on when I was on the field. In post-disaster situations livelihood programs 
should be implemented earlier.  
Cash-for-Work did play an important role in all the studied barangays. Despite the fact that 
the wage from CfW was not high the programs were very important for people that did not 
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have any alternative livelihood options. Usually debris cleaning was offered for both sexes 
whereas construction was mainly for men. Nevertheless it is important to create more 
programs for women or offer the existing programs for women as well. Additional support 
and social security should be provided for elderly and other vulnerable groups that cannot 
work. At the moment of my field work additional support for vulnerable groups did not 
exist. 
The differences between the barangays were prominent in terms of livelihood support and 
financial assistance. Ferreras and Salvacion received a lot more livelihood support, CfW-
programs and financial assistance compared to Sawa. The reasons for that are probably 
various, but according to my data and analysis it seems that both the location and different 
livelihoods practiced in the region may have some influence in it. 
The shelter construction programs by ACT Alliance were participatory in a way that people 
were given materials and guidance to build the houses. Participation decreases the work of 
humanitarian organizations, offers employment for local people and builds the local 
capacity. The rotation of labor enabled more people to participate. However the 
construction program was highly unequal in terms of gender since women could not 
participate and no alternative option was offered for women. As a matter of fact I assume 
that there could be something not as physical in construction programs for women to do, 
but the exclusion of woman had more to do with the attitudes and traditions. Additionally, 
according to the participants interviewed in this study the construction work was only 
offered for men that were beneficiaries of the shelter project. That increased the inequality 
among the people in the barangay.  
New houses built from concrete and wood were sturdy and people were generally very 
satisfied for them. The main problem was the relatively long time that people had to wait 
for the new houses and meanwhile live in unsafe temporary shelters. The construction at 
the new relocation sites had not started yet and people were not aware when it would start. 
Living further from the coast enables safer living conditions, but it complicates practicing 
some of the livelihoods, particularly fishing. There is a need to speed up the shelter 
projects because temporary shelters do not provide enough safety for people. A proper 
shelter is a basic need for human, and living in dangerous locations and inadequate 
buildings increase the risk for disasters. The housing situation together with a vulnerable 
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community and low incomes constitute unsafe conditions which makes the risk for a 
disaster extremely high when a new hazard takes place.  
The actions towards increased disaster preparedness and DRR were still on process 
because the focus had been on the emergency help. Since the country is so threatened by 
different disasters the implication of DRR policies is extremely important. There is a need 
for awareness raising and strengthening the early warning systems. Nonetheless 
Philippines suffered from another strong - yet not as powerful as Haiyan - typhoon called 
Hagupit in December 2014 and the country was spared from the extreme damage. Better 
evacuation and preparedness compared to Haiyan is said to be the reason why Hagupit did 
not cause as much devastation, so it seems like improvement has already happened (Hodal 
2007). Another important issue in DRR is the cooperation with all the humanitarian 
organizations and government because without standardized and well organized trainings 
and other DRR programs, overlapping is likely to happen.  
It is clear that post-disaster early recovery initiatives had been noticed and followed in the 
barangays at least to some level. However there were still things that were lacking in the 
process of linking humanitarian aid to long-term development aid. Yet it has to be kept in 
mind that the situation changes all the time and not enough time has passed for all the 
recovery activities to be accomplished. In addition to emergency help most organizations 
had started activities that link humanitarian aid into development aid, such as supporting 
livelihoods restoration, providing emergency employment, introducing alternative and 
sustainable building materials and technologies, and strengthening the local capacity for 
building shelter.  
7.2. Resilience and capacity building  
 
Haiyan recovery and reconstruction received a lot of donations and therefore international 
organizations were able to stay on the field for a long time. During my field many foreign 
organizations were about to leave the area, but particularly domestic organizations were 
able to continue and extend their programs. The urgent situation had passed and some 
organizations still had money for continuation and thus were able to make a shift to 
development programs.  
A broader participation of the communities, including vulnerable groups, would be needed 
in order to make the local communities independent from external help. Capacity building 
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and the possibility for the people to take ownership of the recovery are key issues in 
successful recovery. The complaint systems did not seem to work properly which decreases 
the opportunities to participate.  
Not only financial capital but also political and social capitals have influence on people’s 
resilience in post-disaster recovery. People had good relationships and active social 
networks that increased their disaster resilience. Received and perceived social support 
strengthened the community resilience as it came to the disaster recovery. The sense of 
community and attachment to place were strong which indicates that the community ties, 
not only the relationships with close friends and family, have a significant role in disaster 
recovery. The participation of people in organizations was somewhat prevalent although 
the disaster had disrupted some of the organizations from functioning. However those 
people that were given a role or a responsibility in the community were proud and 
determined to do their duties. Trough capacity building humanitarian actors can strengthen 
the local disaster preparedness which had happened in forms of creating organizations, 
associations, and providing people possibilities to participate. Political capital, referring to 
government-linked services, information and assets, matters too since people close to 
barangay officials benefited more than others in some cases. 
7.3. Suggestions for future research 
 
Suggestions for future research aroused during this study process. The primary 
continuation for this study would be to research the new relocation sites once they have 
been built and people have settled down there. Even if the new location is safer towards 
disasters, it may cause changes in other fields of life, such as social activities or 
livelihoods. It is important that the local people can participate in the building process at all 
levels.  
Another interesting topic for future research would be disaster/climate change 
displacement. 4 million people were displaced when Haiyan hit the Philippines (Yonetani 
&Yuen 2014). The displacement situation is complex and needs more research. During my 
time on the field I met people who had been displaced or someone they knew had been 
displaced. In the future migration caused by climate change and environmental degradation 
could increase the population displacement so much that the world cannot prevent or 
prepare for it effectively (Morton et al. 2008). Particular focus in displacement should be 
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the most vulnerable people because if they are not recognized it leads to further 
marginalization and vulnerability in relation to disasters.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Individual interview template 
 
Semi-structured interview for barangay residents 
 
Date: _____ Time: _____ Place: _____ 
 
1. Personal information / General demographics  
1.1. Sex 
1.2. Age 
1.3. Marital status 
1.4. Household size  
1.5. Household members 
1.6. Ethnicity: Are you a local of this barangay? Where are you from? How long have 
you lived here? 
 
2. Experience of the disaster and the humanitarian response 
2.1. Describe your experiences of the typhoon  
2.2. What was the biggest need you had after the typhoon? 
2.3. Did anyone ask you about what assistance you needed? Who? When? 
2.4. Did you receive enough help and what kind of help? Did you receive it in time? 
Were you lacking something important?  
2.5. Question for the elderly and disabled: Did you get any help to carry the food 
packages and other heavy items? If yes, who helped you? If not, were you left 
without something important? 
2.6. Did you receive cash or cash transfers in order to buy the things you needed? 
2.7. From whom did you get assistance? Humanitarian organizations, local 
government, other sources? 
2.8. How do you perceive the help? Were you satisfied? 
2.9. Did you have any system for complaints? Were you able to air out your concerns? 
2.10. Were you able to participate or volunteer in the disaster response? In which     
ways? 
2.11. Do you think that the distribution of aid was equal or do you feel that some  
groups have had more benefits than others? 
2.12. Was there any additional help given to the people with disabilities, senior  
citizens or single-parents? 
2.13. Were you informed about the assistance you would be receiving? How? Was 
the information provided in your own language? 
2.14. Have you been informed when the NGOs will end their projects and what 
will happen when they are not here anymore? 
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3. Livelihoods 
3.1. How many income earners there are in your household (fulltime / part-time) 
3.2. What are the main occupations or sources of income in your household 
3.3. Have the occupations or sources of income changed after the typhoon? If yes, 
how? 
3.4. If you are not able to carry out the previous occupation or source of income, what 
is preventing you? 
3.5. Has the income level changed after the typhoon? How? 
3.6. Do you have access to credit or can you borrow money, if needed? If yes, where? 
If no, why not? 
3.7. Have you received any livelihood support from any source? 
3.8. Question for fishermen: How did the typhoon affected on the fishing industry? Did 
it have a noticeable impact on species, mangrove forest, cost etc.? 
 
4. Cash-for-Work 
4.1. Have you participated in Cash-for-Work-programs? Describe it. 
4.2. If you have not been able to participate, why? 
4.3. What kind of work have you done? Debris removal? Construction?  
4.4. What kind of work would/ would have been useful? 
4.5. Is everyone allowed to participate? Does everyone earn the same amount of 
money?  
4.6. How much do you earn from CfW-programmes? Is it enough? 
4.7. Is the money from these programmes earmarked to a specific purpose of use? 
4.8. For how long the programs lasted, have they been long enough? 
 
5. Housing 
5.1. Where did you live before the typhoon and where do you live now? 
5.2. Do you own the land where your house is? If not, are you paying rent? 
5.3. Which materials was your old house made of? 
5.4. If you have been provided a new house, please describe the process.  
5.5. Are you satisfied with the living arrangements at the moment? If not, why? What 
are the things that you are most satisfied with?  
5.6. Do you feel safe in your living area and house? If not, what are you major safety 
concerns? 
5.7. Question for people that have a new house: Do you think that this house will be 
safer if there will be similar typhoons in the future? 
 
6. Social networks 
6.1. Have you received help from you friends and family? 
6.2. Have you been able to help other people? 
6.3. Do you have good and close relationships with your neighbors and other people in 
your barangay? 
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6.4. Do you participate in any community associations or organizations within the 
area?  
If yes, please describe them. If not, why? 
6.5.  Do you think you are able to participate to decision making in your community? If yes, 
how? If not, why not? 
 
7. Disaster preparedness and DRR 
7.1. Are there any evacuation plans in this barangay and has it been the same before 
and after the typhoon? 
7.2. Are there any evacuation centers in your village or nearby in case for future 
disasters? 
7.3. Do you think there has been a change in the frequency of natural hazards in a 
longer term? If yes, please describe. 
7.4. How your community is prepared for future disasters? 
7.5. Have there been any trainings or discussions in this barangay on how to prepare if 
there was a new typhoon or another natural disaster? 
7.5.1. In which ways are you advised to prepare? 
8. Something else? 
 
Appendix 2: Key informant interview template 
 
Semi-structured interview for key informants 
 
Date:_____ Time:_____ Place:_____ 
Organization____________________ 
Role___________________________ 
1. Do you consider co-operation with other humanitarian organizations and government 
has been functional?  
2. Was there a lot of overlapping operations by different organizations? 
3. Were there difficulties in reaching the most distant areas? Did the humanitarian 
emergency aid arrive in time? 
4. Did you receive enough money from donors? 
5. Did you have enough skillful and educated staff and volunteers? 
6. Have vulnerable people and the people-most-in-need been taken into account? How? 
7. Was the needs-assessment gender sensitive? Especially in livelihoods and shelter? Do 
you offer any livelihood support for women? Please describe.  
8. How do you choose the beneficiaries for example to the shelter projects? 
9. Did you come across any unexpected events or issues? Anything was not really 
functional? Something that was lacking? 
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10. Do you have any complaining systems? Have you got any feedback from the crisis- 
affected people? Have you been able to respond to their feedback? 
11. Have you done any monitoring or evaluation to your humanitarian projects? If yes, can 
you tell more? External/internal? 
12. How important sustainability of humanitarian aid is to your organization? Do you 
include disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation to your programs? Have 
you provided any training about disaster preparedness? 
13. How did the communication and informing work?  
13.1. Did you notice any problems or significant misunderstandings with 
translation when the locals speak in different languages?  
14. Do you have an exit strategy for you programs? Have you let the beneficiaries know 
when and how your projects end? 
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PART ONE 
 
May 8th marked six months since the historically strong Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) made landfall in the 
Philippines. Haiyan devastated areas in nine regions of the Philippines, affecting over 14 million people 
with immense damage, displacement and casualties. The cooperative efforts of the humanitarian 
community and the Government have by and large succeeded in preventing a full-blown humanitarian 
crisis, and the humanitarian situation remains stable across the affected regions. This is largely due to 
the resilience of the people and the massive response in the emergency phase. 
 
Relief activities have now transitioned to early recovery. The challenges lie in ensuring that typhoon-
affected communities are given the appropriate support to rebuild their livelihoods and strengthen their 
resilience in the face of future shocks. 
 
With the longer-term recovery programmes of the Government yet to start, there is a significant risk of a 
resurgence of acute humanitarian needs unless immediate action is taken to fill the gap in restarting 
livelihoods and the delivery of basic social services. 
  
While many affected people have returned home and have either rebuilt their houses or set up 
temporary makeshift shelters, about 2 million people remain displaced (OCHA). With the next rainy and 
typhoon season beginning in June, progress is urgently required.  
 
In the end of May, an overnight fire in a canvas tent killed a mother and all of her six children in one of 
the tent settlements still remaining in Tacloban city. The tragedy highlights the slow process of 
resettlement of the survivors of Haiyan.  
 
The Government’s proposed blanket policy on implementing a no-dwelling zone within 40 meters of the 
shoreline as part of disaster risk reduction is one of the most pressing issues for Haiyan affected 
communities. According to available information, more than 100,000 families could be affected by the 
implementation of no-dwelling zones. In addition to that, property rights and ownership issues make it 
difficult to access enough land for building or reconstructing both transitional and permanent shelters. 
 
ACT members are in close coordination with the communities, local government units and other 
humanitarian actors to ensure that their shelter response is meeting the minimum standards and rights 
based approach. Groundbreaking and handover ceremonies by ACT implementing members in April and on 
May marked the start of construction of houses in resettlement areas or the completion of the construction 
of new transitional and progressive houses in safer locations. 
 
Livelihood interventions still remain limited in number and small-scale in size. As farmlands and fishing 
equipment were decimated, people’s ability to produce food or earn an income is still very limited. Tools 
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and seeds are needed so that farmers are ready for the next planting season. ACT members have identified 
and implemented their early recovery and livelihood projects depending on the need of the communities 
they are working with. Lutheran World Relief is particularly working with local partners in Cebu Province 
providing income generating programs such as cash-for-work activities and cash grants. Replacement or 
repair of pump-boats along with other fishing gear and agricultural-related livelihoods are also being done 
while other alternative livelihood programs especially those targeted for women, such as fish-processing, 
have been instigated and are further planned. 
 
Coconut clearing and use of coco lumber have been successfully undertaken by Christian Aid in cash-for-
work activities and for the construction of shelters respectively. An estimated 33 million fallen coconut 
trees represented a significant portion of the ground debris in typhoon-affected areas, but if recycled in 
time, they are a great resource for shelter and livelihoods both. As the coconut industry is one of the major 
source of livelihood in the Haiyan-affected communities, distribution of coconut seedlings would help 
support the rehabilitation of this sector. 
 
New school year starts June 2, but there are still significant shortages of learning spaces and school 
materials. FCA is building semi-permanent learning spaces, after negotiations with the Department of 
Education and other legal partners. FCA focuses on the damaged schools outside the priority of the 
reconstruction by the government agencies. Part of the construction work is done as cash-for-work project.  
 
NCA is continuing the efforts of educating people on sanitation and hygiene and providing latrines and 
restoring water systems in different barangays. 
 
Psychosocial support for the survivors of Haiyan is also a vital area of intervention. Church of Sweden 
trained and supported ACT members in March in considering Community Based Psychosocial Support to be 
part of the response. After the training, some members are developing CBPS work plans, together with the 
communities, to support the communities’ ability for recovery and resilience. 
 
As the Philippines is extremely prone to natural disasters, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) activities are vital 
in building the capacity of the communities. DRR trainings are ongoing, and their emphasis is on 
comprehensive, community-based disaster risk reduction initiatives.  
 
Complaints Handling Mechanism is being established with community workers of NCCP conducting 
consultation meetings to gather recommendations from the affected communities on appropriate ways to 
implement CRM.  
 
ICCO through its local partners is conducting legal missions to various communities to provide free legal 
services. The main objective of the legal missions is to provide assistance in availability of social programs 
and benefits intended for them by the government through reconstruction of legal documents. 
 
May 5-10 ACT Alliance Joint Monitoring Visit took place with participants from 10 countries and 10 
member organizations. The joint monitoring group visited projects in the islands of Cebu, Leyte, 
Samar, Panay and Negros, meeting with the communities and listening to the people’s stories. 
The group found the relief assistance to have been of good quality. The initial recommendations of 
the JMV group included maximizing the potential and collaboration of ACT Alliance member organizations 
in the country, strengthening disaster risk reduction, as well as setting up of a formal complaints 
mechanism in the community level.  Improving ACT Alliance visibility was also suggested.  
 
ACT Alliance members are also consistently attending cluster meetings in the field areas they are present 
in including WASH, FSAC, Shelter, Education, Cash Working Groups, CWPG, and Early Recovery & 
Livelihoods Cluster. FSAC is transitioning to Early Recovery and Livelihood. Housing, Land and Property 
Working Group was established to ensure housing and property rights of affected communities are 
respected. 
 
Challenges facing the ACT forum 
a. The recruitment of a local ACC Coordinator. 
b. Logistics, procurement and supplies for shelter building remain a big concern. Shortage of chain 
saws also affect the production of coco lumbers used in shelter (which are tightly controlled by 
government due to illegal logging). 
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c. The issue of building back better and safer in providing shelters considering all other concerns 
related like land tenure issues (proof of ownership), ‘no build zones’, materials/design, and 
danger zones. 
d. The ’40 meter No Build Zone’ pronouncement from the national government still leaves most 
municipal government officials confused as this has been ‘downgraded’ to ‘hazard/risk zones’.  
Without policies and guidelines in place, local government officials in Samar and Eastern Samar 
particularly struggle on how they are going to proceed. 
e. Inclement weather and the approaching rainy season staring June threatens the rapidity of 
ongoing shelter constructions. Hiring of skilled workers were also demanding. 
f. Clearing of the remaining debris and tree removal from the farms took longer than expected. 
Accessing wood for building or repairing boats were also difficult. 
g. Coordination was not optimal especially at the start. Communication of 3W/4W barangay 
specific details to ACT coordination center is needed.  
h. With local partners reaching their breaking point, ensuring capacities of local partners in 
continuing the implementation of the programs with quality and accountability. Christian Aid 
is committed to diversifying their partner portfolio in an attempt to minimize the dangers of 
‘partner burnout’. 
i. Need for funding continues particularly with the longer term rehabilitation work but funding 
opportunities likely to decline as donors focus on other areas. 
 
 
Other Issues to be Noted 
The setting up of the Office of the Presidential Assistance for Recovery and Rehabilitation (OPARR) 
is being watched carefully as to how best to engage it and concern in its overly private sector bias and 
gatekeeping role.  This might be one of the biggest challenges over the next months. 
 
As to date, OPARR moved the creation of Electronic Monitoring Platform Accountability and 
Transparency Hub for Yolanda (EMPATHY) to improve the management of the rehabilitation effort in the 
Yolanda-affected area. The EMPATHY electronic infrastructure will transmit information from selected 
areas to the Presidential house, thus, allowing the government leaders and cluster groups monitor the 
latest updates from the ground. For transparency purposes, government projects can also be monitored 
right on the ground. 
 
 
FUNDING OVERVIEW 
 
Appeal launched on November 13, 2013 - The target of the appeal is US$16,210,035. 
US$ 12,703,346 has been received which is 78% of the amount requested. The National Forum and other 
members are in the process of revising the appeal.  
 
 
 
ACT emergency response – see part 2 
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PART TWO 
What are ACT members doing both within and outside the ACT appeal? 
Specify the work of each member separately indicating each sector. Please only specify projects with secured funds.  
ACT MEMBER Sector of work Location of work Number of 
people targeted 
(within the 
appeal) 
Number of 
people assisted 
so far (within 
the appeal) 
Number of 
people assisted 
so far (outside 
the appeal) 
CHRISTIAN AID (CA) Food Security 6 barangays across the municipalities of Culion, 
Busuanga, Coron in the province of Palawan 
 
97 barangays across the municipalities of Guiuan, 
Salcedo, Quinapongan, Giporlos, Lawaan, 
Balangiga, Mercedes in the province of Eastern 
Samar 
 
2 barangays across the municipalities of Basey and 
Marabut in Samar Province 
 
45 barangays across the municipalities of Isabel, 
Kananga, Albuera, Leyte, Mayorga, Abuyog,Baybay, 
MacArthur, Dulag, Alang-Alang, Jaro in the province 
of Leyte 
 
9 barangays in Ormoc City 
 
4 barangays in the municipalities of Biliran, 
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Almeria in the province of 
Biliran 
 
80 barangays across the municipalities of Carles, 
Concepcion, Estancia, Dan Dionisio, Lemery, Batad 
in Iloilo Province 
 
3 barangays in the municipality of Loreto in Dinagat 
Island, Surigao del Norte 
7,500 6,584  
 
 
9,854 
 
 
 
650 
 
 
31,060 
 
 
 
 
17,815 
 
315 
 
 
500 
Cash for Work 
 
 
 Food Security 
Barangays in Ormoc City 
 
4 barangays across the municipalities of Isabel, and 
MacArthur in the province of Leyte 
 
 
600 
 
 295 
 
230 
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WASH Repair 
 
 
20 barangays across the municipalities of Basey and 
Marabut in Samar Province 
 
3 barangays in the municipality of Basey in Samar 
Province 
 
1,000 
 
 
7,000 
 
17,950 
 
 
940 
Unconditional Cash 
Transfer 
16 barangays across the Municipalities of Carles and 
Estancia, Province of Iloilo 
  1,861 
Shelter 6 barangays across the municipalities of Basey and 
Marabut in Samar Province 
 
9 barangays across the municipalities of Salcedo, 
Lawaan, and Balangiga in the province of Eastern 
Samar 
 
Ormoc, Leyte 
 
33 barangays across the municipalities of Coron, 
Busuanga, Culion and Linapacan in the province of 
Palawan 
 
3 barangays in Tacloban city 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5,520 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5840 
915 
 
 
795 
 
 
 
1,842 
 
 
 
 
 
759 
Livelihood recovery 
(fishing) 
Municipalities of Carles and Batad in Iloilo Province 
 
18 barangays across the municipalities of Basey and 
Marabut in Samar Province 
 
20 barangays across the municipalities of Salcedo, 
Lawaan, Giporlos, Quinapondan and Balangiga in 
the province of Eastern Samar 
  529 
 
8,520 
 
 
7,550 
Livelihood 
source/environmental 
rehab and protection 
(fish shelters, patrol 
boats) 
Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo   2,918 
CHURCH WORLD 
SERVICE 
Food Cebu: Medellin, Bogo 
 
  5,000 
 
PHL131 Sitrep 3 6 
 
  
 
PAKISTAN/ 
AFGHANISTAN (CWS-
P/A) 
Leyte: Dulag, Tolosa 40,130 
Shelter Biliran: Cabucgayan, Naval, Caibiran, Biliran 
 
Cebu: Medellin, Bogo 
 
Eastern Samar: Gen. Macarthur, Hernani, 
Balangkayan 
 
Leyte: Dulag, Tolosa 
  5,865 
 
2,025 
 
10,000 
 
 
9,250 
DIAKONIE 
KATASTROPHENHILFE 
(DKH) 
Food and NFI distribution Leyte, Samar, Mindoro oriental, Mindoro 
occidental, Masbate, Surigao del Norte, Palawan, 
Capiz, Iloilo, Cebu, Northern Cebu, Bohol 
DKH 
earmarked 
funds for 
NCCP inside 
the appeal 
 85,745 
Shelter Leyte, Samar, Eastern Samar 
Albuera, Quinapondan 
  0 (750 
targeted 
outside 
appeal) 
Psychosocial support Leyte, Samar, Eastern Samar 
Albuera, Quinapondan 
  0 (400 
targeted 
outside 
appeal) 
Livelihood Support Eastern Samar:  
QUINAPONDAN: Poblacion, Anislag,San Isidro, 
Cabilla, Cangahan, Cantinio, 
GENERAL MACARTHUR: Tandang Sora, Tugop, Roxas 
 
West Samar:  
PINABACDAO: Madalunot, Mambog, Laygayon 
CALBIGA: Canbagtik, San Mauricio, Bulao, 
Sinalantang, Guimbanga, Tono, Caamlungan 
SAN SEBASTIAN: Balogo, Kampiyak, Kandayukan 
 
Leyte:  
ALBUERA: Antipolo, Dona Maria, Mahayag, 
Mahayahay 
Salvacion,Tinag-an 
   
2,815 
 
880 
 
 
3,660 
2,865 
 
6,675 
 
 
5,200 
 
5,260 
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CARIGARA: Hilutugan,Kanlampay, Candiganhub, 
Caghalo 
SAN ISIDRO: Crossing, Biasong, Cabungaan, Basud, 
Capinahan, Baglawigan, Banat-i 
7,505 
 
FINN CHURCH AID 
(FCA) 
Education in Emergency, 
TLS construction 
Eastern Samar 
Mercedes Municipality: Brgy: Anuran, Nino Jesus, 
Banuyo, Bobon, Busay, San Jose, San Roque 
 
Quinapondan Municipality: Tinago, Paco, San 
Pedro, Santa Margarita  
 
Giporlos Municipality: Coticot, Gigoso, Paya, 
Cansingkol 
 
Balangiga Municipality: Bacjao, San Miguel, Bangon, 
Southern Samar National High School 
   
112 
 
 
40  
 
 
40  
 
 
64 
HILFSWERK DER  
EVANGELISCHEN 
KIRCHEN SCHWEIZ 
(HEKS) 
Food distribution 
 
Panay Island, Capiz Province 
     Dao 
     Panay 
     Pilar 
     Pontevedra 
 
 
  
6,285 
480 
2,485 
920 
Shelter 
 
Panay Island, Capiz Province 
     Dao 
     Panay 
     Pilar 
     Pontevedra 
   
3,035 
550 
3,795 
415 
Cash for work Panay Island, Capiz Province   500 persons 
INTER-CHURCH 
ORGANIZATION FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION 
(ICCO) 
Food Iloilo 
 
Negros Occidental 
 
Ormoc City, Basey Samar and Biliran Province 
 18,750 
 
8,000 
 
5,000 
 
Non-Food Items Toboso, Negros Occidental  4,445  
Cash Transfer (no specific 
sector) 
Palo, Leyte 
 
 3,200 
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Cash for Work Toboso, Negros Occidental 450 
Livelihood (Agriculture) Carles, Iloilo 
 
Negros Occidental 
 875 
 
4,445 
 
Livelihood (Fish) Batad, Iloilo 
 
Carles, Iloilo 
 
Ormoc City 
 
Sicogon Island, Iloilo 
 225 
 
3,000 
 
1,150 
 
375 
 
Shelter Negros Occidental 
     Sagay 
     Toboso 
 
Aklan 
  
1,500 
4,370 
 
4,700 
 
Psychosocial Support Toboso, Negros Occidental 
 
Bantayan Island, Cebu 
 
Iloilo Province (Batad, Balasan and Carles) 
 
Tacloban City 
 3,391 
 
2,205 
 
1,000 
 
300 
 
DRRM Toboso, Negros Occidental  90 trained  
LUTHERAN WORLD 
RELIEF (LWR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shelter CEBU PROVINCE 
Municipality of Daanbantayan 
     Maya 
Municipality of Bantayan 
     Obo-ob, Sillion 
Municipality of Santa Fe 
     Po-oc 
 
LEYTE PROVINCE 
Municipality of Albuera Barangay –TBD 
Ormoc City, Brgy. Lao 
12,930 people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5,870 people 
9,515 people 
 
 
Non-Food Items CEBU PROVINCE 70,000 people 69,453 people  
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Municipality of Daanbantayan 
     Aguho,  Bahawan,  Bateria,  Bito-on,  Calape,  
Daligding,  Lanao,  Malbago,  Malingin,  Pajo,  
Paypay,  Poblacion,  Talisay,  Taminjao,  Tapilon,  
Tinubdan 
 Municipality of Isabel 
     Biasong, Lanao,  Cawit,  Dapdap,  Esperanza,  
Moabog,  Monserrat, San Isidro 
Municipality of Madredijos 
     Kodia,  Maalat,  Bunakan,  Kaongkod,  Tarong,  
Tugas 
Municipality of Bantayan 
     Botigues,  Kabac,  Kabangbang,  Hilotongan,  
Lipayran,  Tamiao 
 
PROVINCE OF LEYTE 
Municipality of Albuera 
     Balugo 
Municipality of Kananga 
Municipality of Matag-ob 
     Ormoc City 
 
MR(Solar Lamp) CEBU PROVINCE 
Municipality of Bantayan 
    Botigues, Hilotongan,  Lipayran 
Municipality of Madredijos 
     Kinatarkan, Hagdan, Langub, Hilantagaan 
Municipality of Sta. Fe 
     Maalat, Tarong 
16,125 people 16,125 people  
MR(Commodity Voucher) CEBU PROVINCE 
Municipality of Bantayan 
    Botigues, Hilotongan, Lipayran 
Municipality of Madredijos 
     Kinatarkan, Hagdan, Langub, Hilantagaan 
Municipality of Sta. Fe 
     Maalat, Tarong 
13,500 people 13,500 people  
Cash-for-Work (CFW) PROVINCE OF CEBU 
Municipality of Daanbantayan 
23,950 people  22,300 people  
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     Aguho, Bakhawan, Bateria, Bagay, Bito-on, 
Maya, Paypay, Tapilon 
Municipality of Medellin 
     Antipolo, Daanglungsod, Curva, Kawit,  
Mahawak, Cabao-nan, Cagbuhangin, Can-adieng, 
Curva, Danao, Dolores, Lao, Linao, Milagro, 
Naungan, Nueva Vista, San Jose 
 
LEYTE PROVINCE 
Ormoc City 
     Balagtas, Malazarte, Mansahaon, Riverside, San 
Vicente, Sto. Rosario, Cacao, Kawayan, Libertad, 
Monte Alegre, Rizal, San Isidro, Tagaytay, Balugo, 
Dona Maria, Segiunon,  Tagbas 
Municipality of Isabel 
     Marbel (Poblacion) 
WASH (Latrine & 
Community Sanitation) 
LEYTE PROVINCE 
Ormoc City 
     Naungan, Lao 
10,783 people n/a  
WASH (Water Filtration 
Unit) 
LEYTE PROVINCE 
Ormoc City 
Tacloban City 
Municipality of Palo 
Municipality of Tolosa 
Municipality of Tanauan 
 
ILOILO PROVINCE 
Municipality of Concepcion 
Municiplaity of Carles 
 
CAPIZ PROVINCE 
Roxas City 
Municipality of Pilar 
4,000 people n/a  
Livelihood Recovery CEBU PROVINCE 
Municipality of Bantayan 
Municipality of Madredijos 
Municipality of Sta. Fe 
 
LEYTE PROVINCE 
100,000 
people 
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(TBD) 
 
SOUTHERN LEYTE PROVINCE 
(TBD) 
Quality & Accountability 
(Q&A) 
CEBU PROVINCE 
Cebu City 
 
LEYTE PROVINCE 
Ormoc City 
Tacloban City 
 
SAMAR PROVINCE 
Catbalogan City 
 
CAPIZ PROVINCE 
Roxas City 
 
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION 
Quezon City 
500 people 621 people  
NATIONAL COUNCIL 
OF CHURCHES IN 
THE PHILIPPINES 
(NCCP) 
Shelter Barangay Salvacion, Sawa and Serum in Basey, 
Samar  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barangay Odoc and Ferreras in Marabut, Samar 
 Construction of 
440 
progressive 
shelters 
started in 3 
barangays 
targeting a 
total of 3,285 
individuals 
 
Construction of 
116 
progressive 
shelters 
benefitting 960 
individuals 
 
Livelihood Support 
 
 
 
Vegetable Seed Disperal 
Barangay Salvacion, Sawa, Serum, Odoc, Ferreras in 
Samar 
 
  
3,640 
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Rice and Corn Seed Dispersal 
Barangay Embarkadero, Pasayan, Tanao and Bulak 
Norte in Batad, Iloilo 
 
Barangay Salvacion in Basey, Samar 
 
Fishing nets and other gears 
Barangay Embarkadero in Batad, Iloilo 
 
980 
 
 
550 
 
 
385 
Psychosocial Support 
 
 
 
 
 
CBPS Basic Training 
CBPS Trainer’s Training 
CBPS Baseline Data Gathering (FGDs) 
CBPS Need Assessment  
CBPS Orientation 
Psychological First Aid Training (PFA) 
 13 
6 
76 
64 
17 
22 
 
Complaint Response 
Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
Consultation Workshops 
Barangay Tanza, Bulak Norte, Tanao, Pasayan, 
Daan Banwa in Batad/Estancia, Iloilo 
 
Barangay Salvacion and Ferreras in Basey/Marabut, 
Samar 
  
174 
 
 
88 
 
Food Security SAMAR/LEYTE AREA 
Hernani, Eastern Samar 
Basey, Western Samar 
Marabut, Western Samar 
Tacloban City, Leyte 
Albuera, Leyte 
Balangkayan, Eastern Samar 
Catbalogan, Western Samar 
Lawa-an, Eastern Samar 
Quinapondan, Eastern Samar 
Pinabacdao, Western Samar 
 
ILOILO/PANAY AREA 
Estancia, Iloilo 
Batad, Iloilo 
Sara, Iloilo 
Ajuy, Iloilo 
Concepcion, Iloilo 
Lemery, Iloilo 
 
 
  
 
12,985 
29,790 
17,540 
9,860 
2,115 
850 
935 
 
45 
 
 
 
15,960 
3,960 
1,050 
2,500 
1,000 
2,300 
 
 
4,230 
6,770 
 
 
 
 
2,960 
1,085 
6,000 
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San Rafael, Iloilo 
Balasan, Iloilo 
Bingawan, Iloilo 
Duenas, Iloilo 
Lawaan, Antique 
Sagay, Negros Occidental 
Ma-ayon, Capiz 
2,750 
2,245 
1,000 
945 
1,080 
500 
4,750 
NFIs (Beddings) SAMAR/LEYTE AREA 
Hernani, Eastern Samar 
Basey, Western Samar 
Marabut, Western Samar 
 
ILOILO/PANAY AREA 
Estancia, Iloilo 
Batad, Iloilo 
Balasan, Iloilo 
Lemery, Iloilo 
  
1,945 
4,890 
4,955 
 
 
5,375 
2,155 
1,000 
450 
 
NFIs (Hygiene Kit) SAMAR/LEYTE AREA 
Hernani, Eastern Samar 
Basey, Western Samar 
Marabut, Western Samar 
Pinabacdao, Western Samar 
 
ILOILO/PANAY AREA 
Estancia, Iloilo 
Batad, Iloilo 
Sara, Iloilo 
  
1,945 
4,890 
4,955  
 
 
 
4,075 
3,105 
1,050 
 
 
 
 
6,000 
NFIs (Kitchen Utensils) SAMAR/LEYTE AREA  
Hernani, Eastern Samar  
Basey, Western Samar 
Marabut, Western Samar 
 
ILOILO/PANAY AREA 
Estancia, Iloilo 
Batad, Iloilo 
Balasan, Iloilo 
  
1,945 
4,255 
4,955 
 
 
5,225 
3,010 
1,245 
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NORWEGIAN CHURCH 
AID (NCA) 
Water, Sanitation and 
Hygiene: 
Water supplies including 
water trucking, bladder 
tanks 5m/10m, water 
taps, repair water pipes, 
chlorination. Repair of 
community water system. 
Distribution of water 
kits.  
Sanitation including 
temporary latrines, 
construction/rehabilitati
on of latrines in 
communities or 
households.   
Hygiene includes hygiene 
promotion of key people 
in municipality and 
barangay (health 
inspectors, sanitation 
inspector, teachers, 
women) and distribution 
of hygiene kits. 
 
Medellin Municipality, Cebu: 
Don Vergilio Gonzales barangay 
Maharuhay barangay 
Caputatan Norte barangay 
Dalingding Sur barangay 
Tindog barangay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mercedes Municipality, Samar  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basey Municipality, Samar:  
Anglit barangay 
Amandayehan barangay 
Bacubac barangay 
Balud barangay 
Basiao barangay 
Basey bunk houses 
Binungtu-An barangay 
Cambayan barangay 
Canmanilla barangay 
Catadman barangay 
Iba barangay 
80 000 total 
target 
Incl 15,000 
Medelin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incl 15,000 
Mercedes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incl 50 000 
Basey 
   
Medellin 
municipality in 
five barangay:  
15,749  (total 
community) 
target 
group/commun
ity: 
Incl 7788 
females 
Incl 7961 male 
The work in 
Medellin is 
finished by 
December 
2013. 
 
Mercedes 
municipality: 
Distribution of 
hygiene kits 
February 2014: 
approx 15000 
(4575/4575 
(m/f), 
2520/2730 
(g/b), 372/228 
(ef/em) 
 
Basey 
municipality in 
total:  
50423 (total 
community) 
(15379/15379 
(f/m), 
8471/9177 
(g/b), 
1250/766 
(ef/em))   
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Old San Augustin barangay 
Salvacion barangay 
San Antonio barangay 
San Fernando barangay 
Sugca barangay 
Sugponon barangay 
Tingib barangay 
Tinaongan barangay 
UNITED METHODIST 
COMMITTEE ON 
RELIEF 
Food item Aklan 
Antique 
Leyte 
  2,800 
600 
2,900 
Water purifying system Tanauan, Leyte   300 
Education Leyte   500 
Shelter Baranggay Calogcog, Tanauan, Leyte   Target: 218 
permanent 
houses 
